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Abstract 
The finance literature has identified several indirect costs of bankruptcy, being one of 
them asset fire sales. Previous studies on the existence of fire sales of heterogeneous real 
assets have mainly focused on the seller’s stock price reaction at the sale announcement. 
However, these studies have reported conflicting results. As such, we bring new evidence 
on its existence by studying the value creation from acquiring assets from distressed firms, 
focusing on acquisitions of divested assets (assets, subsidiaries, divisions) involving US 
nonfinancial public firms between 1997 and 2017.  
Although, we started by finding that acquiring divested assets from distressed sellers 
create value (to the acquiring firm), suggesting the existence of fire sales, the results also 
suggest the value creation only occurs because investors believe fire sales exist, as the 
primary results are driven by those deals for which the deal value is not known. Our results 
suggest that the type of asset acquired and the method of payment are important 
determinants on investors’ perception of fire sales, as we only find a statistically significant 
positive impact on CAR for those acquisitions that investors may interpret as more likely to 
be a fire sale (i.e., seller’s non-core assets when the method of payment does not involve 
equity). Moreover, the results are consistent with investors assessing differently not 
disclosing the deal value at the announcement date depending on the financial condition of 
the seller. Contrarily to non-distressed acquisitions, in distressed acquisitions there is a 
statistically significant positive impact on CAR when the deal value is not disclosed. 
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Sumário 
De acordo com a literatura, um dos custos indirectos de falência é a venda de activos 
abaixo do seu valor fundamental – fire sales. Estudos anteriores investigando se fire sales 
existem focaram-se principalmente na reacção ao anúncio da venda de activos no preço das 
ações do vendedor. No entanto, os resultados destes estudos não são concordantes. Dessa 
forma, estudamos se fire sales existem analisando a criação de valor na aquisição de activos 
de empresas em dificuldades financeiras, e focando-nos em aquisições de activos 
envolvendo empresas públicas não financeiras Norte Americanas entre 1997 e 2017. 
Apesar de inicialmente os resultados indicarem que adquirir activos de empresas em 
dificuldades financeiras cria valor (para a empresa adquirente), sugerindo que fire sales 
existem, os resultados também sugerem que a criação de valor só ocorre porque os 
investidores acreditam que fire sales existem, uma vez que os resultados iniciais se devem às 
transações para as quais o seu valor não foi divulgado. Os nossos resultados sugerem que o 
tipo de activo adquirido e o método de pagamento são importantes na percepção de fire 
sales por parte dos investidores, uma vez que só verificamos um impacto positivo 
estatisticamente significativo nos retornos anormais acumulados (CAR) para as aquisições 
em que os investidores podem interpretar como mais prováveis de fire sales ocorrerem (i.e. 
activos non-core do vendedor quando o método de pagamento não envolve acções). Para 
além do mais, os resultados são consistentes com a não divulgação do valor da transacção à 
data do anúncio ser avaliada de forma diferente pelos investidores de acordo com a 
condição financeira do vendedor. Contrariamente às aquisições de activos em que o 
vendedor não está em dificuldades financeiras, em aquisições em que o vendedor está em 
dificuldades financeiras há um impacto positivo significativo no CAR quando o valor da 
transacção não é divulgado. 
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1. Introduction 
“Chesapeake Energy: Forced into fire sales? Chesapeake Energy must rapidly sell assets to keep 
itself afloat.” 
- Maureen Farrell1, CNN Money, Apr. 20, 2012 
 
“AMC Entertainment's Fire Sale Has Begun: AMC Entertainment (NYSE: AMC) isn't 
wasting any time shedding assets. (…) To help shore up its finances, which suffer from deep indebtedness in 
addition to that now significant net loss, AMC promised it would unload around $400 million worth of 
assets.”                                             
- Eric Volkman2, The Motley Fool, Aug 12, 2017 
 
 
Since the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), several capital structure 
theories have been developed, and firms’ capital structure choices and their determinants 
have been the focus of many researchers. Under the trade-off theory the present value of 
tax benefits must offset the present value of expected bankruptcy costs at the margin. 
The present value of expected bankruptcy costs depends not only on the probability 
of bankruptcy but also on the magnitude of the bankruptcy costs, which the literature 
divides into direct and indirect costs. Contrarily to the direct costs (e.g. administrative 
costs, legal fees), the indirect (e.g. higher cost of credit, loss of bargaining power to 
suppliers, asset fire sales) are not limited to firms that actually become bankrupt. Firms that 
have high probabilities of bankruptcy can still incur in these costs even if they do not end-
up becoming bankrupt (Altman, 1984). Warner (1977, p. 339) describes indirect costs as lost 
opportunities, and states “they are inevitably difficult, if not impossible to measure”.  
Consequently, there is really no consensus in the literature about their magnitude and 
their relevance. Indeed, Elkamhi et al. (2012) argue that the lack of consensus on the trade-
off theory’s empirical evidence is largely driven by the differences in how the present value 
of the bankruptcy costs have been estimated, and state (p. 76), “(…) by showing that losses 
following bankruptcy are not the dominant consideration for ex ante leverage decisions, our results call for a 
shift in attention toward the types of costs (…) likely to be incurred as the mere possibility of bankruptcy 
increases”. 
                                                 
1 https://money.cnn.com/2012/04/20/markets/chesapeake-energy-fire-sale/index.htm 
2 https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/08/12/it-looks-like-amc-entertainments-fire-sale-has-beg.aspx 
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The aim of this dissertation is to study one of the indirect costs of bankruptcy: asset 
fire sales by distressed firms. A fire sale is a sale of an asset below fundamental value due to 
the seller’s financial distress condition (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992).  
In the real assets fire sale literature there has been mainly two approaches to study 
the existence of fire sales by distressed firms: one is to study the transaction price 
compared to fundamental value (e.g., Pulvino (1998) for aircraft and Chu (2016) for real 
estate properties); the other, due to the difficulty of measuring fundamental value, is to 
study the seller’s stock price reaction to the asset sale announcement, but this last approach 
has found conflicting results. Brown et al. (1994) find that distressed firms that sell assets to 
repay debt experience negative returns, whereas Lang et al. (1995) find that distressed firms 
selling assets to repay debt leads them to positive returns. A possible reason for the 
conflicting results is that the sale announcement conveys more information than the 
information about the fire sale discount (Lang et al., 1995), since the amount received from 
the asset sale leads to a decrease of the probability of bankruptcy, an asset sale 
announcement by a distressed firm should have a positive reaction on the seller’s stock 
price (Lasfer et al., 1996).  
Even so, we argue that a firm may sell assets at fire sale discounts and still have a 
positive stock price reaction at the sale announcement. Asset sales work as a mean to raise 
capital. Consequently, when a firm starts to be in distress and its financial health worsens it 
becomes more likely that it will have to sell assets to ease its financial situation. Thus, the 
stock price will incorporate this likelihood. And even if the firm sells assets at fire sale 
discounts, but the sale price is above to what the market was expecting, the sale 
announcement will be good news and a positive reaction should be expected. However, 
when considering the impact of a fire sale on the stock price of the acquirer a positive 
reaction should always be expected, given that it is buying assets below their fundamental 
value, and the higher the discount, the higher the positive return. With all this in mind, we 
investigate whether asset fire sales exist by studying the acquirer’s value creation from 
acquiring assets from distressed firms.  
The value creation from acquisitions has extensively been studied and a common 
conclusion is that M&A of public targets leads to zero-to-negative announcement returns 
and acquisitions of private targets (subsidiaries or stand-alone firms) to positive returns 
(e.g. Fuller et al., 2002; Moeller et al., 2004; Faccio et al., 2006). This return differential has 
been attributed to the “listing effect”, the common practice of applying the “private 
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discount factor”. In fact, Officer (2007) finds that unlisted targets (stand-alone and 
subsidiaries) were sold at an average discount of 15% to 30% when compared to 
acquisition multiples of comparable listed targets. 
Previous studies (e.g. Masulis and Nahata, 2011; Jindra and Moeller, 2015; Greene, 
2017) have shown that a weaker (stronger) bargaining condition affects negatively 
(positively) the prices obtained by the sellers, which affects positively (negatively) the 
wealth gains for the acquirers. Similarly, we also study how a weaker bargaining position 
affects the wealth gains from the acquisition, and this weaker position is being in distress.  
We argue that if there is in fact a typical discount to provide liquidity, then for 
distressed firms the discount will be higher, which will be represented in higher returns for 
the acquirers, since sellers in a higher need for liquidity are in a weaker bargaining position 
vis-à-vis non-distressed sellers, and, as suggested by Officer (2007), they will be prepared to 
accept lower acquisition prices compared to “fair” value of the assets. In fact, he found that 
on average selling-parents in a higher need for liquidity sold their subsidiaries at 10% 
greater discount than “healthy” parents. 
We focus on acquisitions of divested assets (assets, subsidiaries, divisions) between 
1997 and 2017 involving US nonfinancial public firms, including deals with undisclosed 
deal value and undisclosed method of payment at the deal announcement in order to 
investigate how the market reacts depending on in this lack of information. We exclude 
deals in which the selling firm is already in bankruptcy or in liquidation, because we are 
interested in investigating asset fire sales in order to avoid bankruptcy and not in asset fires 
sales in which the firm is required to sell assets because it is already bankrupt. Besides, the 
motivation/bargaining condition of a distressed firm is completely different from a 
bankrupt firm, as such including bankrupt firms would demand a separate analysis, 
otherwise these deals could drive the results. 
We find that on average acquisitions of assets from distressed sellers create 
significantly more value, which suggests that fire sales of heterogeneous real assets exist. 
However, this result is driven by the deals in which the deal value was not disclosed at the 
announcement. When the deal value is disclosed the returns for acquisitions of assets from 
distressed and from non-distressed sellers are not statistically different from each other. 
The investors only assess the deals for which they do not know the deal value as 
acquisitions at fire sale discounts, which suggests that fire sales only exist because investors 
believe that they exist.  
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Our results suggest that the type of asset acquired and the method of payment are 
important determinants on the market’s perception of fire sales. We find a statistically 
significant positive impact on acquirer returns when acquiring assets from distressed sellers 
but limited to those acquisitions that the market may interpret as more likely to be a fire 
sale, i.e. acquisitions of seller’s non-core assets when the method of payment does not 
involve equity.  
Additionally, we investigate the effect of the deal value non-disclosure on acquirer 
returns. The results are consistent with the market assessing differently the non-disclosure 
of deal value depending on the financial condition of the seller. In line with Sicherman and 
Pettway (1992), and Martynova and Renneboog (2011), we find a statistically significant 
negative impact on CAR when the deal value is not disclosed, but only for non-distressed. 
For distressed it is significantly positive. The results suggest that the lack of information 
about the deal value makes investors pessimist about the amount paid when the acquisition 
is from a non-distressed seller, whereas when the acquisition is from a distressed seller it 
makes them optimist. It makes investors so optimist that the total effect is positive. 
The present work makes several contributions not only on Fire Sales but also on 
M&A literature. First, we investigate asset fire sales by studying the value creation from 
acquisitions of assets from distressed firms and provide evidence suggesting that from 
acquirers’ perspective fire sales exist. And contrarily to Meier and Servaes’s (2015) 
argument, who also find evidence of asset fire sales from acquirers’ perspective but 
focusing mainly on bankrupt sellers, we show that the loss of control in the decision 
making by the selling firm management is not a necessary condition for acquirers to take 
advantage of selling firms in financial distress.   
Second, we analyse the effect of not disclosing the deal value in asset acquisitions 
from distressed sellers, Sicherman and Pettway (1992) focus on a weaker bargaining 
condition of the seller not on seller’s distress, as they argue that a seller does not need to be 
in distress to be in a weaker bargaining condition and use the seller’s credit downgrade as a 
proxy for it.  
Third, we provide evidence on the wealth effects of acquiring assets from distressed 
sellers, previous studies have focused on acquisitions of divested assets as a whole. In fact, 
contrarily to previous work (e.g. Moeller et al., 2004; Slovin et al., 2005; Faccio et al., 2006) 
that finds higher significant returns when acquiring unlisted targets (stand-alone firms, 
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subsidiaries only, and divested assets) with equity, we provide evidence that when the 
acquisition is from distressed sellers the returns are insignificant.  
And fourth, as Martynova and Renneboog (2011), we also include in our sample 
deals with undisclosed deal value, and deals with undisclosed method of payment. 
However, they do not include acquisitions of divested assets in their sample and when they 
analyse the returns by method of payment they group them together. Our results suggest 
that for acquisitions of divested assets the deal value non-disclosure plays a more important 
role on returns than not disclosing the method of payment only, as we find positive 
significant returns for both distressed and non-distressed acquisitions when only the 
method of payment is undisclosed, possibly because the market assumes that the 
acquisition is going to be financed by all-cash. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we provide 
an overview of we consider to be the most relevant literature for our topic. In Chapter 3 
we develop our main hypothesis and present the methodology that we employ. In Chapter 
4 we describe our sample construction and characteristics. Chapter 5 presents our results, 
and in Chapter 6 we conclude.  
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2. Literature Review 
In this chapter we provide an overview of what we consider to be the most relevant 
literature for our topic. We start with the Trade-Off Theory then it follows some possible 
explanations for assets sales proposed by the literature. In the third section the concept of 
fire sales is presented as well as empirical studies on its existence, and in the fourth we give 
an overview of studies concerning Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A). Finally, in the fifth 
and final section, we present what we consider to be the literature gap our study fills. 
 
2.1. Trade-Off Theory 
The seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) led to several contributions from 
different authors3 to develop the Trade-Off Theory. This theory states that there is an 
optimal amount of debt in the capital structure for each firm, which will depend on a trade-
off between the benefits and the costs of debt financing4.  
According to the theory, the primary benefit from debt is that interest payments are 
tax deductible. As such, a higher usage of debt increases the amount of interest payments, 
which decreases the amount of taxes paid. However, as the debt ratio increases it also 
increases the probability of bankruptcy (Scott, 1976). Therefore, a firm will increase the 
amount of debt in its capital structure, only if the present value of the marginal tax benefits 
offsets the present value of the marginal expected bankruptcy costs (Myers, 2001).  
The present value of expected bankruptcy costs depends not only on the magnitude 
of the direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy, but also on the probability of bankruptcy. 
The direct costs of bankruptcy include legal, accounting, filling and other administrative 
costs, all the expenses that a firm incurs when going through the process of bankruptcy; 
whereas the indirect costs are not limited to firms that actually become bankrupt. Firms 
that have high probabilities of bankruptcy can still incur in these costs even if they do not 
end-up becoming bankrupt (Altman, 1984). The indirect costs include lost sales, lost 
profits, higher cost of credit, loss of bargaining power to suppliers, lost of investment 
opportunities, asset fire sales.  
                                                 
3 See, for example, Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Scott (1976), Kim (1978). 
4 In the costs and benefits of debt are also included the reduction of agency costs between managers and 
shareholders (Jensen, 1986), but also the increase of agency costs between shareholders and bondholders 
(Harris and Raviv, 1991). Therefore, an optimal capital structure includes trading-off these agency benefits 
and costs of debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
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The theory predicts a cross-sectional relationship between debt ratios and asset risk, 
taxes, profitability, and asset type. And in regard to the latter, authors have argued that 
there is a link between the optimal amount of debt in the capital structure and their 
liquidation values. 
 
2.2. Asset Sales 
An asset sale5 is the transfer of control of a subsidiary, division, or other combination 
of assets to another entity for cash, securities, and/or other future consideration (Hite et al., 
1987).  An asset sale is not only an important way for a firm to resolve financial distress 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1992), but it can also work as a mean to restructure the firm’s 
business portfolio (Lasfer et al., 1996). 
The empirical evidence on asset sales suggests that they are typically a value enhancer 
operation, leading to positive abnormal returns at the sale announcement6. The literature 
also provides several possible explanations for the motivation to sell assets as well as for 
the value gains at the sale announcement. 
According to the efficiency hypothesis, a firm sells assets to those that can manage them 
more efficiently. The buyer values the asset highly due to its ability to generate cash flows 
from it, which can come from competitive advantages or operational synergies. Therefore, 
it is willing to pay a high premium for the asset, which will be reflected in the seller’s 
abnormal return at the sale announcement7 (Hite et al., 1987). 
The focusing hypothesis, as proposed by John and Ofek (1995), suggests that firms 
engage in asset sales to increase the focus on their operations. By selling unrelated assets to 
its core business, the firm is able to eliminate negative synergies and to be more focused on 
its core business. These will lead to a better performance of the remaining assets. The 
present value of the future cash flows generated by the remaining assets will increase, 
which will be represented in value gains at the announcement.  
An alternative view, the financing hypothesis, argued by Lang et al. (1995), is that asset 
sales provide funds when other sources of finance are too expensive, becoming the 
cheapest way to finance new investments. However, for firms with high agency problems 
                                                 
5 An asset sale can also be described as a sell-off or a divestiture. 
6 See, for example, Rosenfeld (1984), Klein (1986), Hite et al. (1987), Sicherman and Pettway (1992), John and 
Ofek (1995), Lang. et al. (1995). 
7 The sale can be seen as a positive net present value project, because the present value of the cash flows that 
the seller can generate with the asset will be lower than the price received. 
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between shareholders and managers, if the proceeds are going to be retained by the firm a 
negative reaction should be expected (Lang et al., 1995); while for firms paying-out the 
proceeds, or in financial distress and/or highly leveraged a positive reaction should be 
expected (Lang et al., 1995; Lasfer et al., 1996). 
The liquidity hypothesis is connected to the three previous ones. Schlingemann et al. 
(2002) argue that, conditional on having fundamental reasons to sell assets and having the 
choice of which ones to sell, a firm will sell the assets that are relatively more liquid, 
meaning that they can be sold faster without a discount. However, the eagerness to sell 
typically reduces the amount received due to a weaker bargaining position (Aktas et al., 
2010), and for distressed firms their necessity to sell may lead to fire sales. 
 
2.3. Fire Sales 
The concept of fire sales has long evolved since its beginnings, in the nineteen 
century, when it was used to describe goods sold at deep discounts due to fire damage. 
Nowadays, in finance, a fire sale is a sale of an asset at a dislocated price (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1992), meaning that the price received does not reflect its long run potential, its 
fundamental value8. The sale is forced, in the sense that the seller is experiencing constrains 
that diminishes his bargaining power, typically financial constrains. Therefore, the firm has 
to sell assets to raise funds9, leading it to have to accept prices that otherwise it would not.  
There is a wide variety of empirical studies on the existence of fire sales. 
Adaptations10 of the concept of fire sales have been done for different types of assets and 
of constrains that affect the bargaining power of the seller. Even though the concept of fire 
sales is well established, the approaches to what defines the existence of fire sales, among 
studies, vary.  
One of the approaches found in the literature is to study the transaction price 
compared to an estimated fundamental value11. 
Pulvino (1998) studies the sale of used aircraft by financial distressed US firms, 
between 1978 and 1991, and finds that distressed airlines sold used aircraft at an average 
                                                 
8 In Shleifer and Vishny (1992), they begin by using the expression “value in best use”, but along the paper 
the expressions “value in best use” and “fundamental value” are used interchangeably.  
9 The financing hypothesis for asset sales mentioned in the previous section. 
10 Krugman (2000) developed a model of Fire Sales for FDI. He suggests that when a country is affected by a 
crisis, the countries’ corporate assets are sold to foreign investors at discounted prices. For studies on this 
issue see, for example, Chari et al. (2010), Weitzel et al. (2014), Alquist et al. (2016). 
11 The fundamental value is estimated through hedonic regressions, or it is set as a benchmark or fair value of 
comparable assets. 
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discount of 10% to 20% compared to healthy airlines. Moreover, when the industry is 
distressed and the prices are depressed, the distressed firms are net-sellers of used aircraft 
and the non-distressed firms net-buyers. While when the industry is booming and the 
prices are high they find the opposite, the distressed firms become net-buyers and the non-
distressed net-sellers. As such the discount is costly for distressed firms but it represents a 
buying opportunity for non-distressed firms.  
Ang and Mauck (2011), using the stock price one month prior to the announcement, 
investigate fire sale discounts in M&A of US distressed public targets during economic 
crisis, between 1977 and 2008. However, instead of a discount, they find that distressed 
targets received a significant higher average premium than non-distressed targets, both in 
normal as in crisis periods (12.46 p.p. and 34.65 p.p., respectively). Conversely, when they 
use the 52-week high instead, they do find significant discounts, which they attribute to 
acquirers’ managers viewing the price paid as a significant fire sale discount. Additionally, 
they analyse the three-year Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) of the acquiring 
firms and do not find evidence supporting the existence of fire sales.  
Chu (2016) examines the sale of Real Estate Owned (REO) properties by US 
commercial banks during the financial crises (2008-2010). His results show that banks with 
lower liquidity level received lower sale prices for REO properties and these properties 
experienced higher price reversals in the following sales. 
Another approach found in the literature is to identify fundamental value ex post by 
studying the patterns of transaction prices over time, and fire sales are said to exist if the 
price shows reversals. 
Coval and Stafford (2007) show that financially distressed US mutual funds sold 
equities at an average 7.9% discount. A similar finding was obtained by Edmans et al. 
(2012) in a study of price effects on takeover activity. They also show that distressed 
mutual funds sold equities at fire sale discounts and the price reversal, as Coval and 
Stafford (2007), took 24 months. 
Ellul et al. (2011) investigate the fire sale of downgraded corporate bonds by 
regulated-constrained US insurance companies. They find that constrained insurance 
companies are more likely to sell downgraded bonds at prices farther from fundamental 
value, with a significantly lower median discount of 6%. Besides the evidence on fire sale 
discounts, a similarity between this study and the one by Pulvino (1998) is that the discount 
deepens when the assets’ acquirer is a non-natural buyer, which is consistent with Shleifer 
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and Vishny (1992). In their theoretical model, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) show that the fire 
sale discount is higher when the buyer is an industry outsider. The argument behind it is 
that because industry outsiders are not specialized in the asset use, they will not value the 
asset as highly as industry insiders and, thus, will offer even lower prices. 
More recently, Dinc et al. (2017) study the sale of minority equity stakes in publicly 
listed firms by industry distressed firms in the US, between 2000 and 2012. Their results 
show an average industry-adjusted discount of 8%12. They also find that when the stake 
sold is higher than 5%, the average industry-adjusted discount increases to about 14%, but 
they do not find any discount when this type of sale is done in non-distressed deals. 
A different approach is found in Brown (2000). He compares the effect of the 
decline in commercial real estate values on mortgage and equity real estate investment 
trusts (REITs) and shows that financially distressed mortgage REITs experience significant 
negative stock returns when they sell foreclosed real estate, during 1989 and 1992. He also 
finds that, during this period, mortgage REITs are net sellers and equity REITs are net 
buyers and suggests that the decline in real estate values forced a systematic sale of real 
estate at fire sale discounts that represented a buying opportunity for less leveraged firms.  
Another approach found in the literature is to study the seller’s stock price behavior 
at the asset sale announcement. 
Dennis and Dennis (1995) study asset sale announcements by US firms that became 
distressed after leverage recapitalizations13. They find that the average cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) for non-distressed firms is significantly positive while for distressed firms is 
insignificantly negative.  
Brown et al. (1994) examine asset sales by distressed firms between 1979 and 1988 in 
the US, and report that the average abnormal return for distressed firms that sell assets to 
repay debt is negative, but insignificant. However, a conflicting result is found by Lang et al. 
(1995). In their study of asset sales by US firms between 1984 and 1989, they find that 
distressed firms selling assets to repay debt experience significant positive returns. They 
suggest that a possible reason for the conflicting results is that the sale announcement 
conveys more information than the information about the fire sale discount.  
 In line with this previous reasoning, Lasfer et al. (1996) argue that since the amount 
received from the asset sale leads to a decrease of the probability of bankruptcy, an asset 
                                                 
12 A similar average discount is found when they use the seller’s distress condition instead of industry distress. 
13 The authors define leverage recapitalizations as operations in which debt is raised to pay-out to 
shareholders. 
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sale announcement by a distressed firm should lead to a positive reaction on the seller’s 
stock price. Indeed, in their study of asset sales by UK firms, between 1985 and 1986, they 
show that distressed firms experience significantly higher positive abnormal returns than 
non-distressed. 
More recently, Finlay et al.  (2016), in a study of asset sales by UK firms between 
1988 and 2009, and due to the conflicting results found in the literature, propose that the 
stock price reaction at the sale announcement will depend on the type of distress condition: 
firm-level, industry-wide14 and economy-wide distress, and also on the interaction between 
these distress conditions. Their results for firm-level distress are similar to Lasfer et al. 
(1996), with a higher positive abnormal return for distressed firms than for non-distressed, 
however they are not statistically different. The interaction between firm distress and 
industry distress, leads to insignificant returns, and the interaction among the three 
measures of distress leads to significant positive abnormal returns. 
Finally, the last approach found in the literature is to study the acquirer’s stock price 
behavior at the acquisition announcement. 
Meier and Servaes (2015) study the value creation from acquisitions of bankrupt and 
distressed firms as well as acquisitions of divested assets from bankrupt and distressed 
sellers in the US, between 1982 and 2012. They define as fire sale acquisitions those in 
which the seller/firm is in liquidation, in bankruptcy, or in distress and find, for their three-
day event window, significant positive mean abnormal returns for all type of acquisitions, 
however, fire sale acquisitions yield significantly higher returns than regular transactions 
(i.e., non-bankrupt, non-liquidating, and non-distressed). The mean abnormal returns for 
fire sale acquisitions of assets is 3.04% while for regular asset acquisitions is 1.51% and for 
fire sale acquisitions of firms is 4.76% while for regular firm acquisitions is 0.81%. Their 
result for fire sale acquisitions of firms is similar to the one document by Hotchkiss and 
Mooradian (1998) in their study of acquisitions as a means of restructuring bankrupt firms 
(Chapter 11) between 1972 and 1992, in the US. Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) report 
that, for their event window [-1;+5], acquirers of bankrupt firms experience significant 
positive abnormal returns of 4.0%. 
More recently, Oh (2018) studies the wealth effect from acquiring distressed but 
non-bankrupt US public firms between 1980 and 2010. He defines as fire sale acquisitions 
                                                 
14 According to Shleifer and Vishny (1992), an industry-wide shock would make industry insiders to be less 
likely to bid for the assets, and, thus, only industry outsiders would bid for the assets, leading to lower 
acquisition prices.  
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those in which both target and its industry are in distress, and, in the multivariate analysis, 
he finds that acquirers in fire sale acquisitions experience statistically higher three-day 
CARs and also two-year BHARs than acquirers in other transactions. Moreover, he finds 
that fire sale targets received statistically lower transaction prices than other targets. 
 
2.4. Mergers and Acquisitions 
While the Fire Sale literature studies the value loss for selling firms, the M&A 
literature has extensively studied the value gains for acquiring firms. In the first sub-section 
we start by presenting some of these studies and also studies on how the bargaining 
condition of the target/seller affects the value creation from the acquisition; and in the 
following one we present some of the determinants of acquirer returns. 
 
2.4.1. Value Creation from Acquisitions 
As formerly mentioned, the value creation from acquisitions has extensively been 
studied and a common conclusion is that M&A of public targets leads to zero-to-negative 
announcement returns and the acquisition of private targets (subsidiaries or stand-alone 
firms) to positive returns15(e.g. Fuller et al., 2002; Moeller et al., 2004; Faccio et al., 2006). 
This return differential has been attributed to the “listing effect”, the common 
practice of applying a “private discount factor”. Fuller et al. (2002) argue that because 
private targets are less liquid, the acquirer is in a stronger bargaining position and, thus, it 
captures the discount. In fact, Officer (2007) reports that unlisted targets (stand-alone and 
subsidiaries) were sold at an average discount of 15% to 30% when compared to 
acquisition multiples of comparable listed targets, and also that parent-firms constrained by 
a higher need for liquidity sold their subsidiaries at an average 10% greater discount. He 
suggests that acquisition discounts for unlisted targets are the price paid by their owners to 
access an important source of liquidity. 
Consistent with this “private discount factor” both Fuller et al. (2002) and Moeller et 
al. (2004) find a significant positive CAR for US acquirers of subsidiaries16 (2.75% and 2%, 
respectively). Faccio et al. (2006) also find a significant positive average CAR (1.44%) for 
acquisitions of subsidiaries by Western European firms.  
                                                 
15 See annex 1 for a summary of the results of recent studies showing this return differential. 
16 Moeller et al. (2004) use the term subsidiary acquisition to denote acquisitions of subsidiaries, divisions, and 
branches. 
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The results from these more recent studies for the US are in line with the one 
reported by Rosenfeld (1984), in his study of the effects of voluntary divestitures on 
shareholder’s wealth, between 1969 and 1981 in the US. He finds, for a three-day event 
window around the announcement, a positive significant return for acquirers of divested 
assets of 2.1%. 
Similarly, Sicherman and Pettway (1992) analise the effects of voluntary divestitures 
on shareholder’s wealth in the US, but between 1981 and 1987, and find a significant 
positive CAR for their two-day event window, however smaller (0.50%). Additionally, they 
study if the credit downgrade of the seller before the sale announcement affects its 
bargaining position. They argue that a firm does not need to be in distress to lose 
bargaining power since the downgrade can inform the buyers that the firm’s financial 
condition has negatively changed. The CAR for acquisitions of assets from downgraded 
sellers increases and for non-downgraded decreases, however they are both marginally 
significant. 
The literature also provides other studies investigating if the bargaining position of 
the target and/or seller influences the value creation from the acquisition. 
Masulis and Nahata (2011) analise the effects of venture capital (VC) backing on the 
value creation of private firm acquisitions. One of their findings is that firms backed by 
funds closer to liquidation, therefore more likely to exert greater pressure on their portfolio 
firms to sell and avoid long negotiations, received a significantly lower median takeover 
premium than by those backed by VC funds farther from liquidation (3.25% and 6.38%, 
respectively). They also find, for their five-day event window, a higher median CAR for 
acquisitions of firms backed by VC funds closer to liquidation (5.04% vs. 3.81%), however 
the difference is not statistically significant.  
Jindra and Moeller (2015) argue that targets with greater financial independence have 
a stronger bargaining position. In their study on how the financial independence of US 
public targets affects the takeover premia and the value creation from acquisitions between 
1982 and 2008, they show that acquisitions of more financially independent targets are 
associated with higher takeover premia and lower acquirer announcement returns.  
More recently, Greene (2017) investigates if the deregulation of the US banking 
industry affected the bargaining power of private targets on M&A by public firms between 
1992 and 2000. The results suggest that deregulation improved private firms’ bargaining 
position, which led to an increase in the targets valuation multiples and, therefore, a 
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decrease in acquirer announcement returns. For the eleven-day event window, the average 
CAR for acquirers of targets operating in a non-deregulated banking environment is 4.23%, 
and 2.93% when the target operates in a deregulated environment. 
 
2.4.2. Determinants of Acquirer Returns 
Several factors have been reported to influence acquirer returns, including the 
acquirer’s size, the relative size of the deal, the method of payment, the industry relatedness 
of the acquisition, deal value (non-)disclosure, among others. 
Acquirer’s Size. Studies have shown that acquirer returns are inversely related to its 
size, finding that announcement returns for acquiring firms are higher for small firms and 
lower for large ones (e.g. Loderer and Martin, 1990; Moeller et al., 2004; Faccio et al., 2006; 
Jindra and Moeller, 2015). Roll (1986) hypothesises that managers may suffer from hubris 
that makes them overpay in acquisitions, and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find that managers 
tend to have more firm ownership in small firms than in large ones. Managers of larger 
firms may be more prone to hubris because they feel more important socially, since they 
have succeeded in growing the firm, and also face fewer obstacles to finance the deal, while 
in small firms the managers and shareholders’ incentives are more aligned (Moeller et al., 
2004). As suggested by Moeller et al. (2004) the acquirer’s size may proxy for the severity of 
agency costs. 
Relative Size of the Deal. The relative size of the deal, which is typically defined as the 
ratio between the deal value and the market value of the acquirer, also influences acquirer 
returns. However, the literature has produced mixed results in regard to its impact. For 
example, Asquith et al. (1983), and Jarrel and Poulsen (1989) find a positive relationship 
between relative size and acquirer returns, while Travlos (1987) and Alexandridis et al. 
(2013) find a negative one. Fuller et al. (2002) and Moeller et al. (2004) also find a negative 
effect on CAR as the relative size increases when their analysis is limited to acquisitions of 
public targets or when it is limited to large acquirers, respectively. Loderer and Martin 
(1990) argue that acquirers experience greater losses when buying large targets because they 
are more likely to overpay. Also, larger targets are associated with greater complexity in 
terms of their integration and management that makes it more difficult for acquirers to 
achieve the expected economic benefits from the deal (Alexandridis et al., 2013). 
Nevertheless, for acquisitions of unlisted targets, several studies have found a positive and 
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statistically significant effect of relative size on acquirer returns (e.g. Fuller et al., 2002; 
Slovin et al., 2005; Faccio et al. 2006; Mantecon, 2008; Masulis and Nahata, 2011). 
Method of Payment. According to the literature, the method of payment is one of the 
most significant determinants of acquirer returns. While it has been observed that 
acquisitions of public targets with equity leads to lower returns (e.g. Travlos, 1987; Fuller et 
al., 2002), for acquisitions of unlisted targets (stand-alone firms, subsidiaries, and divested 
assets) the opposite has been found, with payments with equity leading to higher returns 
than with all-cash (e.g. Chang, 1998; Moeller et al., 2004; Slovin et al., 2005; Faccio et al., 
2006). The lower returns for acquisitions of public targets with equity are consistent with 
Myers and Majluf (1984), because it signals negative information about the shares’ value 
(Travlos, 1987), however, for acquisitions of private targets the opposite has been argued. 
According to Chang (1998) and Slovin et al. (2005), the willingness of the target/seller to 
accept equity signals positive private information about the value of the acquirer and the 
assets acquired, because the target/seller becomes exposed to the risks of the acquirer’s 
value and future performance. Therefore, they will be incentivised to assess the acquiring 
firm’s prospects carefully (Chang, 1998) so that accepting equity can generate more 
favorable returns than all-cash (Slovin et al., 2005). 
 Industry Relatedness. The industry relatedness between the acquirer and the target also 
affects acquirer returns. Recent studies have reported higher gains when the acquirer and 
target are in related industries (e.g. Sicherman and Pettway, 1987; Morck et al., 1990; 
Maquieira et al., 1998; Moeller et al., 2004), and also that firm value decreases with the 
degree of diversification (e.g. Berger and Ofek, 1995; Comment and Jarrell, 1995). Synergy 
gains tend to be higher for focus-increasing than diversification deals, and therefore the 
likelihood of overpayment is lower (Chang, 1998). Also, corporate combinations are more 
likely to succeed if between related firms, because there is a greater knowledge about the 
business and thus can be managed more efficiently (Sicherman and Pettway, 1987). Though 
corporate diversification may bring benefits such as greater debt capacity and lower taxes, it 
may also bring costs, such as overinvestment and subsidization of poor performing 
businesses (Berger and Ofek, 1995). 
Deal Value (Non-)Disclosure. The deal value (non-)disclosure at the announcement also 
affects acquirer returns. Sicherman and Pettway (1992) find that acquirers of divested assets 
experience positive and significant returns when the deal value is disclosed, and positive 
insignificant returns when not disclosed, the difference is significant at 10% level. When 
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they divide the undisclosed deal value sample according to whether the seller has been 
downgraded or not, the acquirers’ returns remain insignificantly positive. Martynova and 
Renneboog (2011) also find, for their entire short window, that bidders in takeovers in 
Continental Europe and UK during the fifth takeover wave experienced positive, but 
insignificant returns when the deal value (and/or the method of payment) was undisclosed, 
and that this lack of disclosure concerning the deal characteristics has a significant negative 
effect on bidding firms returns. These results are consistent with Milgrom’s (1981) model 
in which, given incomplete information, not disclosing all information leads the 
uninformed to rationally expect this information to be unfavorable. 
 
2.5. Literature Gap 
Several studies provide empirical evidence on the existence of fire sales and show 
how they lead to losses for distressed sellers and gains for the acquirers. However, for more 
heterogeneous real assets the empirical studies have produced conflicting results. 
Consequently, the question on the existence of fire sales for this type of assets still remains 
to be answered, leading to our research question: Do asset fire sales exist? 
Our study differs from previous ones on aspects such as sample size and time period, 
it includes periods that have not been studied yet. But most importantly, we study fire sales 
from a different approach to what is the standard in the real assets fire sale literature. We 
contribute to the fire sale literature by providing additional evidence and by investigating 
the existence of fire sales by studying the value creation from acquiring divested assets 
from distressed firms only instead of measuring the wealth effects on the seller’s stock 
price at the sale announcement. Also, we include in our sample deals with undisclosed deal 
value and/or undisclosed method of payment. 
Considering the value creation from acquisitions, as mentioned previously, it has 
extensively been studied and the empirical evidence shows that the bargaining power of the 
target/seller affects the acquirers’ returns. However, these studies have mainly focused on 
returns differentials among public and unlisted targets, or on factors that affects the 
bargaining condition of the firms involved in the deal other than distress only. Also, they 
typically focus on acquisition of subsidiaries only or divested assets (subsidiaries, assets, 
divisions) as a whole. As such, we contribute to the M&A literature by studying the wealth 
effects from acquiring divested assets from distressed firms.  
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We consider the studies of Meier and Servaes (2015), and Sicherman and Pettway 
(1992) as the most similar to ours. Meier and Servaes (2015) also investigate asset fire sales 
from the acquirer’s perspective. However, they mainly focus on asset sales by firms already 
in bankruptcy or liquidation, given that, at best, only 25% (92 deals) of their sample of 
distressed and bankrupt/liquidating deals are distressed deals, and that when analysing the 
returns they do not make any distinction between them. As such, their results do not apply 
to distressed sellers because the bargaining position of a firm that is in distressed and sells 
assets to ease its financial situation in order to avoid bankruptcy is completely different 
from a firm whose management is no longer fully in control of the decision making and is 
required to sell assets because it is already in bankruptcy or in liquidation. Sicherman and 
Pettway (1992) study the wealth effects of acquiring divested assets from sellers in a weaker 
bargaining condition and also include in their sample deals with undisclosed deal value. 
However, while they study if the credit downgrade of the seller affects the acquirer’s 
returns, ours involve distressed sellers. 
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3. Hypothesis Development and Methodology 
In this chapter, and based on the previous one, we develop our main hypothesis and 
also present the methodology that we employ in our study in order to answer to our 
research question. 
 
3.1. Hypothesis Development 
The fire sale literature provides several different methodologies to study fire sales 
and this variation is a consequence of the necessity to estimate fundamental value. 
However, the conclusions about its existence depend severely on how fundamental value is 
measured.  
For example, for certain assets it is not possible to estimate fundamental values 
through hedonic regressions (e.g. Pulvino, 1998; Chu, 2016), nor to observe fundamental 
value ex post through price reversals (e.g. Coval and Stafford, 2007; Edmans et al., 2012). 
Consequently, for more heterogeneous real asset, the standard methodology is to analyse 
the short-term impact on the seller’s stock at the sale announcement through event studies 
(e.g. Brown et al., 1994; Lang et al., 1995).  
The short-term event study methodology relies on the assumption that the stock 
market operates efficiently, thus, any new relevant information will be incorporated fully 
and instantaneously into the stock prices. At the time of the announcement of an asset sale 
all the future benefits and costs associated with the deal will be assessed by the market, and 
as such the stock price will behave accordingly.  For announcements the market assesses as 
value-enhancing there will be an abnormal increase in the stock price; and for value-
destroying there will be an abnormal decrease. 
However, as formerly mentioned, previous studies investigating fire sales through the 
analysis of the seller’s stock price behavior at the sale announcement have reported 
conflicting results. Lang et al. (1995) suggest that a possible reason for these conflicting 
results is that the sale announcement conveys more information than the information 
about the fire sale discount. Since the amount received from the asset sale leads to a 
decrease of the probability of bankruptcy, an asset sale announcement by a distressed firm 
should lead to a positive reaction (Lasfer et al., 1996). Therefore, the costs from the fire sale 
discount would have to be deep enough to offset the benefits from the decrease of the 
probability of bankruptcy. 
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Even so, we argue that a firm may sell assets at fire sale discounts and still have a 
positive stock price reaction at the sale announcement. Asset sales work as a mean to raise 
capital. Consequently, when a firm starts to be in distress and its financial health worsens it 
becomes more likely that it will have to sell assets to ease its financial situation. Therefore, 
the stock price will incorporate this likelihood. And even if the firm sells assets at fire sale 
discounts, but the sale price is above to what the market was expecting, the sale 
announcement will be good news and a positive reaction should be expected. However, 
when considering the impact of a fire sale on the stock price of the acquirer a positive 
reaction should always be expected, given that it is buying assets below their fundamental 
value, and the higher the discount, the higher the positive return.   
Fuller et al. (2002) and Faccio et al. (2006) have attributed to the “listing effect” the 
wealth gains from acquisitions of private targets, meaning that the typical “private discount 
factor” leads to gains for the acquirer. This can be interpreted as acquisitions of assets 
below their fundamental value lead, in fact, to higher returns for the acquirers. Therefore, 
to investigate fire sales we employ the standard methodology used in the M&A literature to 
study the value creation arising from acquisition announcements on the short-term.  
Previous studies17 have shown that a weaker (stronger) bargaining condition affects 
negatively (positively) the prices obtained by the sellers, which affects positively (negatively) 
the wealth gains for the acquirers. 
We argue that if there is in fact a typical discount to provide liquidity in the sale of 
private targets, then for distressed firms the discount will be higher, which will be 
represented in higher returns for the acquirers than for acquirers of assets from non-
distressed sellers. Since sellers in a higher need for liquidity, such as firms in distress, are in 
a weaker bargaining position vis-à-vis non-distressed, and, as suggested by Officer (2007), 
they will be prepared to accept lower acquisition prices compared to “fair” value of the 
assets.  In fact, he found that on average selling-parents in a higher need for liquidity sold 
their subsidiaries at 10% greater discount than “healthy” parents. Our hypothesis is then: 
 
H1: Acquisitions of divested assets from distressed sellers lead to higher (positive) abnormal returns 
for the acquiring firms than acquisitions of assets from non-distressed sellers. 
                                                 
17 See annex 2 for a summary. 
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3.2. Methodology 
As already mentioned in the previous sub-section, to investigate fire sales we employ 
the standard methodology used in the M&A literature, the event study approach, to study 
the value creation arising from acquisition announcements on the short-term (e.g. Fuller et 
al., 2002; Faccio et al., 2006). And in a second stage we study the impact of distress on 
acquirer returns. As such, this sub-section is divided into two different ones. In the first we 
focus on the event study methodology and in the second one we present our main model 
for the multivariate analysis. 
 
3.2.1. Event studies 
The event study methodology relies on the assumption that the stock market 
operates efficiently and any new relevant information about the event – the deal 
announcement – will be incorporated fully and instantaneously into the stock prices, as 
such the event impact is captured by the abnormal returns (MacKinlay, 1997).  
The abnormal return is the actual ex post return of the stock of the firm over the 
period surrounding the event under study – the event window – minus the normal return 
of the firm for that same period. The normal return is defined as the expected return for 
that stock without the event taking place. Thus, for the acquiring firm in deal   and event 
date   the abnormal return is written by equation (3.1), where     ,     and        are the 
abnormal, actual, and normal return (or expected return) for time period  , respectively. 
                (3.1) 
According to the Market Model, the expected return of any given stock is related to 
the return of the market portfolio and is given by equation (3.2).  
                (3.2) 
Where        and     are the period-  returns on security   and the market portfolio 
respectively; and   , and    are parameters of the Market Model.    is the average return of 
acquiring firm in deal   that is independent from the market return during period  , and    
measures the sensitiveness of the acquiring firm stock returns with respect to the market 
returns. 
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Since our sample involves only U.S. acquirers listed on American exchanges we use 
S&P 500 Index as a proxy for the market portfolio. In regard to the models employed, we 
use two different models of expected returns, we also calculate the simple Cumulative 
Returns. The firms in our sample are involved in different deals in short periods of time, 
preventing us from estimating the Market Model parameters, as such in our models of 
expected returns     . The expected return in our models is then written as equation 
(3.3). 
             (3.3) 
Concerning the    parameter, given that we are unable to use the regression betas of 
each firm, in our Market Model we use as proxy for the    of each firm Damodaran’s 
industry betas18. The other expected returns model employed is the Market-Adjusted 
Model, in this model      .  
Brown and Warner (1985) show that for short-window event studies, weighting the 
market return by the firm’s stock beta does not significantly improve the power of the test. 
As such, as Fuller et al. (2002), as Faccio et al. (2006), or as Masulis and Nahata (2011), 
among others, the main analysis of the returns is done using the Market-Adjusted Model. 
In our expected returns models, the daily abnormal returns, which are calculated by 
using the logarithm transformation, are given by equation (3.4). 
                           (3.4) 
The daily abnormal returns are then cumulated for each event window chosen, and 
the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the acquiring firm in deal   and event window 
[     ] is given by equation (3.5). 
                 
  
    
 (3.5) 
 
  
                                                 
18 http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/, accessed on February 15th, 2018. 
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3.2.2. Multivariate Analysis 
To determine the effect of seller’s distress condition, we perform a multivariate 
analysis of acquirer returns. We also include variables that prior studies found to influence 
acquirer returns. Our main model is defined by equation (3.6) 
                                                               
(3.6)                                                        
                 
The variables’ definition as well as their expected relationship with CAR, the 
dependent variable, are as follows19. 
     is the cumulative abnormal return of the acquirer surrounding the 
announcement of deal  . 
          is a zero-one dummy variable, one represents an acquisition of assets from 
a distressed seller, zero otherwise. We follow John et al. (1992), Lang et al. (1995), Bhagat et 
al. (2005), Ang and Mauck (2011), and Finlay et al. (2016), and define firms in distress as 
those with negative earnings on the previous fiscal year to the sale announcement20. 
Previous studies analysing acquirer returns show a positive coefficient for variables 
representing a weakened bargaining position of the seller (e.g. Sicherman and Pettway, 
1992; Masulis and Nahata, 2011; Greene, 2017), which is the case of a firm in distress. As 
such we expect a positive effect. 
When the method of payment is available on Zephyr database we group it into two 
different categories: all-cash and equity. We follow Fuller et al.’s (2002) approach to define 
methods of payment that are all-cash and those that involve equity21. All-cash includes full 
payments of any combination of cash, debt, and liabilities; and equity includes payments 
with any element of equity.         is then a zero-one dummy variable equal to one if the 
method of payment involves any form of equity, and zero otherwise. Contrary to what is 
usually observed in acquisitions of public firms, previous studies have shown that in 
                                                 
19 See annex 3 for a summary of the variables definition. 
20 We obtain similar results when using other definitions of firms in distress. Among them: 1) including 
additionally selling firms with two years of negative earnings in the previous three to the sale announcement; 
2) requiring additionally for the selling firm to have lower cash flows than short-term debt (Whitaker, 1999); 
3) having negative earnings in the previous two years to the sale announcement (Bhagat et al., 2005; Ang and 
Mauck, 2011); and 4) having low coverage ratios in the previous year to the sale announcement (e.g. Lang et 
al., 1995; Pulvino, 1998; Bhagat et al., 2005). 
21 Fuller et al. (2002) group the methods of payment into three different categories: all-cash; all-stock; and 
mixed. Mixed is defined as any combination of cash and stock, and in which is included methods of payment 
classified by the database as “other”, we follow the same approach. 
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acquisitions of unlisted subsidiaries and divested assets when the method of payment 
involves equity acquirers experience higher returns that those that pay with all-cash (e.g. 
Moeller et al., 2004; Slovin et al., 2005; Faccio et al., 2006). Thus, we expect a positive sign. 
            is a zero-one dummy variable equal to one if the deal involves the 
acquisition of seller’s core-assets, and zero otherwise. We follow Fuller et al. (2002) and 
define the assets sold as core assets if they share the same 3-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code with the seller22, and as non-core assets otherwise. Fuller et al. 
(2002) find higher returns for acquisitions of non-core assets, therefore we expect a 
negative sign.  
                 is a zero-one dummy variable equal to one if the assets acquired 
are from a related industry, zero otherwise. As Faccio et al. (2006), we define an acquisition 
as related if the acquirer shares the same 3-digit SIC code with the assets acquired and as 
unrelated acquisition otherwise23. Sicherman and Pettway (1987) show that the acquisition 
of divested assets from related industries leads to higher returns, so we expect a positive 
sign.  
              is the ratio between deal value and the acquirer’s size. When the deal 
value24 is not disclosed at the announcement, we make the assumption that investors are 
able to infer the relative deal size given that when the deal is announced it is provided 
information of which assets are going to be acquired. As such, for the deals that we are able 
to find the amount paid, even if only disclosed after the announcement date, we use it as a 
proxy. It has been shown that acquirers of unlisted targets experience higher returns as the 
relative deal size increases (e.g. Fuller et al., 2002; Slovin et al., 2005; Masulis and Nahata, 
2011), thus, a positive effect is expected.  
      is the logarithm of the acquirer’s size. As Masulis and Nahata (2011), we define 
the acquirer’s size as the market value of equity one month before the deal announcement 
date. Moeller et al. (2004) provide evidence that the acquirer’s CAR is inversely related to its 
size, as such we expect a negative relationship.  
We also control for other factors that may influence acquirer returns. As Fuller et al. 
(2002) and Faccio et al. (2006) we account for the possibility that cross-border acquisitions 
                                                 
22 Fuller et al. (2002) use the terms “diversified seller” when the subsidiary sold does not share the 3-digit SIC 
code with the selling firm, and “nondiversified seller” otherwise. 
23 Faccio et al. (2006) use the term “within acquisition” when the acquisition is in a related industry. 
24 We take the deal value from Zephyr database. Zephyr describes deal value as “consideration paid for the 
actual stake acquired”. 
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may have a different effect than domestic ones. We define as cross-border acquisition 
when the assets acquired do not have the US country code on Zephyr database. Thus, 
              is a zero-one dummy variable, one if the acquisition is cross-border, zero 
otherwise. 
Larger firms have better access to Capital Markets (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995), 
which may provide them a stronger bargaining position in the negotiation process vis-à-vis 
smaller firms, however, asset sales by larger firms may be subject to greater discounts if 
bidding firms are unable to absorb larger asset sales (Finlay et al., 2016), thus, we control 
for the seller’s size. As Finlay et al. (2016), we define large firms as those larger than the full 
sample median and as small otherwise. We make the same assumption as with the 
acquirer’s size and define size as the market value of equity one month before the deal 
announcement25.              is a zero-one dummy variable, one if the asset seller is small, 
zero otherwise.  
           is the spread between the average rate charged for commercial and 
industrial loans and the fed funds rate in the previous quarter to the announcement date 
reported in the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending. Harford (2005) 
argues that the C&I spread is a proxy for the overall liquidity or the ease of financing in the 
economy, and that it affects the market for corporate control26. 
We also include in all our models dummy variables that control for acquired assets 
industry fixed effects and deal announcement year fixed effects. 
 
  
                                                 
25 Instead of a dummy variable we could have used a similar variable to acquirer’s size, i.e. the logarithm of 
seller’s market value. However, the correlation between our distress indicator and the logarithm of seller’s 
market value is quite higher than with the small seller indicator, therefore we opt to use this measure to avoid 
multicollinearity issues in our regression analysis. 
26 In unreported results, alternatively to the C&I spread we used Schlingemann et al.‘s (2002) liquidity index 
and obtained similar results. However, using the liquidity index leads us to lose a larger number of 
observations, thus we opt for the C&I spread. 
25 
4. Sample 
4.1. Sample Construction 
The sample is collected from Zephyr Bureau Van Dijk Database and is composed by 
completed asset acquisitions (assets, subsidiaries, divisions)27 announced from January 1, 
1997 to December 31, 2017, and between firms with a primary address in the United States 
of America28. We start in 1997 because is the first year available on Zephyr.  
For a deal to be included in our sample, the following conditions have to be satisfied:  
1) both sellers and acquirers are public listed firms at the time of the announcement 
and the assets sold/acquired unlisted;  
2) at the announcement date29 (event day 0) the acquirer has a minimum stock price 
of $2 and its stock is listed on AMEX, NASDAQ, or NYSE;  
3) acquirer’s adjusted stock prices are available on DataStream Database for the 
trading days for our longest event window around the announcement date [-10;+10];  
4) the acquisition must be completed, the acquirer does not have any toehold 
position on the assets prior to deal announcement, and it acquires 100% stake of the assets;  
5) None of the parties involved in a deal (acquirer/seller/assets) has a primary SIC 
code within 6000-6999 (Financial industry)30;  
6) in each deal is involved only one seller and one acquirer;  
7) the seller has to have accounting information on DataStream for at least the 
previous fiscal year to the deal announcement; and  
8) an acquirer cannot have announced another deal (acquisition/divestiture) within 
our longest event window, except when the deals have the same announcement date and 
they are all acquisitions from the same seller. In that case, we add the deal values and 
consider them as one deal only.  
Moreover, deals within the same firm; that resulted on reverse mergers; asset 
exchanges; and due to bankruptcy processes are excluded from our sample. We exclude 
deals in which the selling firm is already in bankruptcy or in liquidation, because we are 
                                                 
27 In our analysis we do not make any distinction among acquisitions of assets, subsidiaries, or divisions, as 
such we use the term asset acquisition (or sale) to denote an acquisition (or sale) of assets, subsidiaries, or 
divisions. 
28 We only require both acquiring and selling firms to have as primary address the United States of America, 
as such we have in our sample cross-border acquisitions, because, given that our focus is on acquisitions of 
divested assets, the assets acquired can be foreign. 
29 As Dinc et al. (2017), when the deal is announced on a weekend or holiday, we use as announcement date 
the nearest week day prior to the announcement. 
30 The exclusion of utilities does not affect our main conclusions. 
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interested in investigating asset fire sales in order to avoid bankruptcy and not in asset fires 
sales in which the firm is required to sell assets because it is already bankrupt. 
We do not require a minimum deal value or a minimum relative size because since 
we are investigating fire sales the deal value may not represent the true value of the assets 
acquired. We also do not require the deal value or the method of payment to be disclosed 
at the announcement.  
The main rationale of the sample criteria is to ensure that the deals are as comparable 
as possible. We require the sellers to be public to guarantee the reliability of the data and 
we exclude private sellers because their listing status may entail a different bargaining 
condition, and therefore affect the returns. Given that our distress definition is based on 
financial characteristics of the seller, having more than one seller would lead to the 
problem of defining the deal as distressed or non-distressed. Besides, having more than one 
seller could translate in a different bargaining position when compared to a deal that only 
has one, and the same applies to having more than one acquirer. Also, the percentage of 
stake acquired may influence the returns and Zephyr database does not provide 
information about each stake acquired when there are multiple acquirers. 
As Fuller et al. (2002) and Masulis and Nahata (2011) we require a minimum stock 
price of $2 to limit the bid-ask bias31. We exclude clustered deals within our longest event 
window, because we cannot isolate the announcement effects of each deal. We require no 
toehold positions on the assets acquired in order to try to minimize the anticipatory effects 
of the acquisition and we exclude partial acquisitions because the economic benefits of 
partial acquisitions are more difficult to determine due to the high level of market 
anticipation (Masulis and Nahata, 2011).  
To assemble our dataset, we collect the deal information from Zephyr, namely 
parties involved, their country code, SIC code, deal announcement date, method of 
payment, deal value32; all firms’ accounting and market data from DataStream; and the C&I 
spread from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System website33. Missing data 
was searched and collected from firm’s electronic fillings on the Securities Exchange 
Commission’s (SEC) EDGAR database34. We also use this last database to verify the 
exchange where acquirers’ stock was listed at the deal announcement. When the exchange 
                                                 
31 As with Masulis and Nahata (2011) imposing a minimum of $5 does not change our results, but it leads to 
fewer observations. 
32 When the deal value is not available in US dollars, we use the exchange rate at the announcement date. 
33 https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/e2/e2chart.html, accessed on March 9th, 2018. 
34 https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html, accessed on February and March 2018.  
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reported on Zephyr is different from the one on firm’s SEC filings we use the data from 
this last source. 
After applying all the criteria, our final sample yielded 1,115 deals, in which 381 
(34%) deals are acquisitions of assets from distressed sellers (Distressed acquisitions) and 
734 (66%) deals are acquisitions from non-distressed sellers (Non-Distressed acquisitions).  
Panel A of table 1 shows the deals distribution by year. The deals distribution by year 
is quite balanced, the year with the highest number of deals is 2001 and it represents 9.1% 
of our sample. In 1997, 1998, and 1999 there is a small number of deals, but except for 
these years, 2017 is the year with the lowest number of deals, representing 2% of the 
sample. Considering distressed and non-distressed deals, their distribution is similar to the 
full sample and quite balanced, apart for some exceptions. In 2003 and 2009, there is a 
larger proportion of distressed than non-distressed, and unfortunately, we do not have any 
distressed acquisition in 1997 and 1998.  
Panel B (table 1) shows the deals distribution by the industry of the assets acquired. 
In our sample, 42.3% of the deals are in the Manufacturing industry, 23.5% in Services, 
17.5% in Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services (Utilities), 
9.6% in Retail and Wholesale, 6.7% in Mining and Construction, and 0.4% in Agriculture 
and Public Administration (Other). In terms of distressed and non-distressed acquisitions, 
they have similar distributions to the full sample, there is a slightly larger fraction of 
distressed acquisitions in the Services industry, compensated by a smaller one in the 
Utilities. 
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Table 1. Deals Distribution by Year and Industry 
This table shows the deals distribution by year (Panel A) and by the Industry of the assets 
acquired (Panel B) for the full sample, and for Distressed and Non-Distressed acquisitions. 
 
All  Distressed  Non-Distressed 
 N %  N %  N % 
Panel A: Deals Distribution by Year        
1997 3 0.3%  0 0.0%  3 0.4% 
1998 4 0.4%  0 0.0%  4 0.5% 
1999 7 0.6%  3 0.8%  4 0.5% 
2000 71 6.4%  23 6.0%  48 6.5% 
2001 101 9.1%  35 9.2%  66 9.0% 
2002 91 8.2%  44 11.5%  47 6.4% 
2003 100 9.0%  54 14.2%  46 6.3% 
2004 86 7.7%  26 6.8%  60 8.2% 
2005 78 7.0%  26 6.8%  52 7.1% 
2006 80 7.2%  18 4.7%  62 8.4% 
2007 69 6.2%  19 5.0%  50 6.8% 
2008 45 4.0%  15 3.9%  30 4.1% 
2009 43 3.9%  23 6.0%  20 2.7% 
2010 41 3.7%  14 3.7%  27 3.7% 
2011 41 3.7%  9 2.4%  32 4.4% 
2012 36 3.2%  8 2.1%  28 3.8% 
2013 47 4.2%  11 2.9%  36 4.9% 
2014 60 5.4%  17 4.5%  43 5.9% 
2015 52 4.7%  15 3.9%  37 5.0% 
2016 38 3.4%  15 3.9%  23 3.1% 
2017 22 2.0%  6 1.6%  16 2.2% 
Total 1,115 100.0%  381 34.2%  734 65.8% 
Panel B: Deals Distribution by the Industry of the Assets Acquired 
Manufacturing 472 42.3%  157 41.2%  315 42.9% 
Mining and Construction 75 6.7%  27 7.1%  48 6.5% 
Retail and Wholesale 107 9.6%  34 8.9%  74 10.1% 
Services 262 23.5%  104 27.3%  157 21.4% 
Utilities 195 17.5%  57 15.0%  138 18.8% 
Other 4 0.4%  2 0.5%  2 0.3% 
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4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for our sample35. Sellers are larger than 
acquirers, the mean (median) seller size is $21.9 billion ($3 billion). The mean (median) 
acquirer size for the full sample is $11.3 billion ($1.7 billion). Considering the deal value 
and the relative deal size36, the mean (median) deal size is $373 million ($67 million), the 
mean (median) relative deal size is 18.3% (4.5%). 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the full sample, all variables are defined on 
annex 3. 
 Mean Median Std. Deviation N 
Acquirer Size ($ Million) 11,252 1,716 35,540 1114 
Seller Size ($ Million) 21,932 2,954 57,597 1112 
Seller Leverage (%) 30.7 28.2 24.4 1113 
Deal Size ($ Million) 373 67 2,488 975 
Relative Deal Size (%) 18.3 4.5 66.0 974 
C&I spread (%) 2.41 2.36 0.415 1110 
Core Assets Sold (%) 40.9     456 
Related Industry (%) 43.9     490 
Cross Border (%) 9.5     105 
Undisclosed Deal Value (%) 24.7     287 
Undisclosed Method of Payment (%) 41.4     462 
All-Cash (%) 49.2 – – 549 
Equity (%) 9.3     104 
 
In regard to the type of asset sold, in 59.1% of the sample the assets sold are non-
core. The majority of assets acquired are from an unrelated industry, 56.1%; and only 9.5% 
of the assets acquired are from a foreign country.  
Out of the 653 deals in which the method of payment was disclosed, 84% are all-
cash deals, which is slightly lower than the 87% of Faccio et al. (2006), but higher than the 
75% of Fuller et al. (2002) also for subsidiaries and the 70% of Slovin et al. (2005) for 
                                                 
35 Each deal is considered independently. For example, according to our proxy for size the larger firm in our 
sample is involved in eleven deals as a seller and in three deals as an acquirer. Accordingly, as a seller its size is 
measured eleven times and three times as an acquirer, and all of them are then considered. 
36 In these two variables are included 147 deal values that we were able to find on firm’s SEC filings. 
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divested assets; the remaining 16% involve equity as method of payment. In 287 (24.7%) 
deals the deal value was not disclosed and in 462 (41.4%) the method of payment was not 
disclosed. In regard to the latter, by searching on firm’s SEC fillings we were able to find 
the method of payment of 322 (69.7%) deals: 96.9% were all-cash. Thus, even when the 
method of payment is not disclosed the great majority end-up being paid with all-cash. 
Table 3 exhibits the descriptive statistics for distressed and non-distressed 
acquisitions. The firms involved in non-distressed deals are on average (and at the median) 
larger than the firms involved in distressed deals. The mean (median) acquirer size for 
distressed is $8.8 billion ($1.3 billion) and for non-distressed is $12.5 billion ($2 billion), the 
difference is significant at 10% (1%) level. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Distressed and Non-Distressed Acquisitions 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the Distressed and Non-Distressed samples. All 
variables are defined on annex 3. For the differences between the two samples, we performed the t-
tests for means and the Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) for medians. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 Distressed  Non-Distressed 
Mean Median N  Mean Median N 
Acquirer Size ($ Million) 8,767 1,297 381  12,544  1,966    733 
Seller Size ($ Million) 4,168 411 378  31,080    5,874    734 
Seller Leverage (%) 35.8 32.7 380  28.1    26.7    733 
Deal Value ($ Million) 160 43 350  492   89    625 
Relative Deal Size (%) 18.4 3.1 350  18.2 5.4    624 
C&I Spread (%) 2.42 2.38 350  2.41 2.36 730 
Core Assets Sold (%) 45.4   173  38.6     283 
Related Industry (%) 44.8   171  43.4   319 
Cross Border (%) 7.3   28  10.5    77 
Undisclosed Deal Value (%) 21.5   82  27.9     205 
Undisclosed Method of Payment (%) 34.6   132  44.9      330 
All-Cash (%) 55.1 – 210  46.2    – 339 
Equity (%) 10.2   39  8.9   65 
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Non-distressed sellers are significantly larger than their distressed counterparts (p-
value<0.01), which was expected. Whitaker (1999) finds a median industry-adjusted decline 
in firm’s market value of equity in the first two years of distress of 46.76%. Also, as 
expected, similarly to Lasfer et al. (1996), distressed sellers rely more on debt financing than 
non-distressed sellers, both means and medians are statistically different at 1% level.  
The mean (median) deal value is statistically larger for non-distressed acquisitions, 
however, the mean relative deal size is insignificantly higher for distressed acquisitions, 
mainly driven by the smaller size of acquirers in distressed deals. The median relative deal is 
significantly higher for non-distressed acquisitions.  
Considering the type of assets being sold, both samples have the majority of deals as 
acquisitions of seller’s non-core assets. However, there is a larger fraction of core-assets 
sold by distressed firms, the difference is statistically significant at 5% level. The results 
suggest that distressed sellers are more likely to sell core-assets than non-distressed sellers. 
In terms of industry relatedness of the acquisition, both samples have the majority of 
deals as acquisitions of assets from unrelated industries. In regard to cross-border, there is 
a larger fraction of deals in the non-distressed than in the distressed sample (10.3% and 
7.3%, respectively), and the difference is statistically significant at 10%.  
In terms of deal value non-disclosure at the announcement, there is a significantly 
higher fraction of deals that did not disclose the deal value in the non-distressed sample37.  
Considering the method of payment, there is a larger fraction of deals with 
undisclosed method of payment in the non-distressed sample (a difference of 10 p.p.) that 
drives slightly the results making the fractions for distressed larger. However, out of the 
deals in which the method of payment was disclosed, the fraction of deals by method of 
payment is basically the same: around 84% for all-cash for both. When we consider the 
methods of payment that we were able to find on SEC’s fillings, the fraction of deals 
remains quite similar to one another: all-cash 87.7% for distressed and 88.6% for non-
distressed. By taking into consideration that is the higher percentage of undisclosed 
methods of payment in the non-distressed sample that makes the results statistically 
different, the results suggest that both types of acquisitions are as equally likely to be 
financed by all-cash. 
  
                                                 
37 Out of the 82 deals in the distressed and of the 205 in the non-distressed samples with undisclosed deal 
value we were able to find 51 and 96, respectively. 
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5. Results 
In this chapter we present our results, which are divided into three main sections, the 
first is the univariate analysis, the second one the multivariate analysis of the effect of 
distress on acquirer returns, and in the third we also perform a multivariate analysis but 
focusing on the effect of the deal value non-disclosure. 
 
5.1. Univariate Analysis  
5.1.1. Full Sample 
Table 4 presents the results from the event study methodology applied to the full 
sample according to the three models used: Cumulative Returns, Market-Adjusted Model, 
and Market Model; and for three event windows considered: [-10;+10] (Panel A), [-10;+1] 
(Panel B), and [-1;+1] (Panel C).  
 
Table 4. CARs for the Full Sample 
This table shows the results from the event study methodology applied to the full sample. 
CR stands for Cumulative Returns, MAM for Market-Adjusted Model, and MM for Market Model. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
CR 
 
MAM 
 
MM 
Panel A: CARs for Event Window [-10;+10] 
Mean 1.91%     1.80%     1.75%    
Median 1.64%     1.07%     1.18%    
% Positive 57%  55%  55% 
Panel B: CARs for Event Window [-10;+1] 
Mean 1.84%     1.77%     1.74%    
Median 1.48%     1.03%     0.93%    
% Positive 60%  57%  57% 
Panel C: CARs for Event Window [-1;+1]     
Mean 1.42%     1.41%     1.41%    
Median 0.88%     0.62%     0.68%    
% Positive 59%  58%  57% 
N 1,115  1,115  1,115 
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Consistent with previous studies (e.g. Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 2002; Faccio et al., 
2006) we find that acquisition of unlisted targets create value, the average CARs are 
positive and significant at 1% level for all event windows considered: [-10;+10], [-10;+1], 
and [-1;+1], and also for the three models used. In all models the CARs for our longest 
event window (Panel A) are higher than for the other event windows (Panel B and C), 
suggesting that, on average, the acquisitions were indeed value enhancing operations that 
created value for the shareholders and not a temporary effect. 
Independently of the event window or the model used, the mean CARs are higher 
than the 0.50% reported by Sicherman and Pettway (1992), however smaller than 
Rosenfeld’s (1984) 2.1% or Moeller et al.’s (2004) 2%.  
The mean CARs for the entire window under analysis can be observed on figure 1. 
In all models, since the beginning of the event window and until the announcement day 
(event day 0) there is an increasingly positive return that is never completely erased. The 
CARs for the three models show similar behaviors for the entire window, although after 
the announcement day for the Cumulative Returns the CARs become slightly superior. 
 
Figure 1. CARs for the 21-days event period centered on the announcement date for 
the full sample 
This figure shows the CARs for the entire event window [-10;+10], for three different 
models. CR stands for Cumulative Returns, MAM for Market-Adjusted Model, and MM for Market 
Model. 
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5.1.2. Distressed versus Non-Distressed Acquisitions 
In this sub-section we focus on the object of our study and show the results from the 
event study methodology by dividing the sample into distressed and non-distressed 
acquisitions. As formerly stated, distressed acquisitions are those in which assets are 
acquired from distressed sellers (i.e. those with negative earnings in the previous fiscal year 
to the sale announcement), and non-distressed acquisitions are those in which assets are 
acquired from non-distressed sellers (i.e. those with positive earnings in the previous fiscal 
year to the sale announcement). 
Table 5 reports the results for the three models: Cumulative Returns, Market-
Adjusted Model, and Market Model. For each model the results for distressed and non-
distressed acquisitions are shown as well as the differences between the two samples. As 
with the results for the full sample, we have considered three event windows: [-10;+10] 
(Panel A); [-10;+1] (Panel B); and [-1;+1] (Panel C).  
Similarly to the results for the full sample, the CARs for distressed and non-
distressed acquisitions, for each model and for each event window are on average positive 
and statistically different from zero (p-value<0.01). For distressed, as for the full sample, 
we find higher returns for event window [-10;+10] (Panel A). For non-distressed however, 
except for Cumulative Returns, the highest returns are for event window [-10;+1] (Panel 
B), which suggests that on average the value created with the acquisition was slightly erased 
after event day 1. 
The results show that for each of the models and for each of the event windows 
considered, the mean CAR is higher for distressed acquisitions than for non-distressed, 
suggesting that acquisitions of assets from distressed sellers create more value than 
acquisitions of assets from non-distressed sellers. However, we do not find statistically 
significant differences between the CARs of distressed and non-distressed acquisitions for 
Cumulative Returns or for event window [-1;+1] (Panel C) in any model.   
For event window [-10;+10] (Panel A), the difference is statistically significant for the 
Market Model at 10% level, for both mean and median CARs. As for event window [-
10;+1] (Panel B), the difference between the mean CARs is statistically significant at 10% 
level for the Market-Adjusted Model and for the Market Model, and between the median 
CARs is also statistically significant for both, but at 5% level.  
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Table 5. CARs for Distressed and Non-Distressed Acquisitions 
This table shows the results from the event study methodology applied to the Distressed and Non-Distressed samples. Distressed represents 
acquisitions of assets from distressed sellers and Non-Distressed represents acquisitions of assets from non-distressed sellers. Diff. stands for the difference 
between the Distressed and the Non-Distressed samples. For means we performed T-tests, for medians we performed Wilcoxon signed rank tests, and 
Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests for the differences between medians.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 Cumulative Returns 
 
Market-Adjusted Model  Market Model 
 Distressed Non-Distressed Diff. 
 
Distressed Non-Distressed Diff.  Distressed Non-Distressed Diff. 
Panel A: CARs for Event Window  -10 10  
 
       
Mean 2.46%    1.63%    0.83 p.p. 
 
2.63%    1.36%    1.27 p.p.  2.69%    1.27%    1.42 p.p. 
Median 1.66%    1.63%    0.03 p.p. 
 
1.95%    0.79%    1.16 p.p.  2.23%    0.56%    1.68 p.p. 
% Positive 57% 56%  
 
58% 53%   59% 53%  
Panel B: CARs for Event Window  -10 1  
 
       
Mean 2.33%    1.59%    0.74 p.p. 
 
2.49%    1.40%    1.08 p.p.  2.47%    1.36%    1.11 p.p. 
Median 1.57%    1.36%    0.21 p.p. 
 
1.64%    0.75%    0.89  p.p.  1.58%    0.58%    1.00  p.p. 
% Positive 61% 59%  
 
60% 56%   60% 55%  
Panel C: CARs for Event Window  -1 1  
 
       
Mean 1.58%    1.33%    0.25 p.p.  1.71%    1.25%    0.46 p.p.  1.72%    1.25%    0.48 p.p. 
Median 0.70%    0.99%     0.29 p.p.  0.62%    0.67%    -0.05 p.p.  0.67%    0.69%    -0.01 p.p. 
% Positive 56% 60%   57% 58%   58% 57%  
N 381 734   381 734   381 734  
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As such, our hypothesis that acquisitions of divested assets from distressed sellers 
lead to higher returns for the acquiring firms than acquisitions of assets from non-
distressed sellers is supported by our findings for the Market-Adjusted Model and the 
Market Model for event window [-10;+1]; and event window [-10;+10] for the Market 
Model. These results suggest that, on average, fire sales of heterogeneous real assets exist. 
On figure 2 the mean CARs for the whole event window and for the three different 
models can be observed: fig. 2a) for Cumulative Returns, fig. 2b) for Market-Adjusted 
Model, and fig. 2c) for Market Model. As with the full sample, the mean CARs behavior 
shows similarities across the three different models, despite the similarities being higher for 
the Market-Adjusted Model and the Market Model. 
In all models, the mean CARs for the distressed and the non-distressed samples 
show different behaviors both in the preceding as in the following days to the 
announcement day (event day 0).  
 
Figure 2. CARs for the 21-days event period centered on the announcement date for 
Distressed and Non-Distressed acquisitions 
This figure shows the CARs for the entire event window [-10;+10], for three different 
models. The figure is divided into three different figures, fig. 2a) for Cumulative Returns (CR), fig. 
2b) for Market-Adjusted Model (MAM), and fig. 2c) for Market Model (MM). 
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(Continuation of figure 2) 
 
 
 
Concerning the days following the announcement, for the non-distressed sample the 
mean CARs behavior is quite stable, decreasing slightly in the last days of the event 
window. Whereas for the distressed sample, the mean CARs decrease to increase again 
reaching the highest values at end of the event window.  
In regard to the preceding days to the announcement day, it is in this set of days, 
namely [-10;-2], that we find the most interesting differences between the mean CARs 
behaviors. For non-distressed acquisitions the pre-announcement CAR is positive but 
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insignificant in all models, in fact, except for Cumulative Returns (fig. 2a), there is barely a 
sustainable and noticeable increase in the CARs especially when compared to the mean 
CARs for distressed acquisitions that keeps increasing (except on day 4). For distressed 
deals, the CARs for these preceding days are positive and statistically significant at 10% 
level for the three models, the median CAR is also statistically significant for the three 
models at 5% level. The difference between median CARs for distressed and non-
distressed acquisitions is statistically significant at 10% level for the Market and Market-
Adjusted Models38. 
The results suggest different anticipatory behaviors by the market depending on 
whether it is a distressed or a non-distressed acquisition. There are possible reasons for 
these different anticipatory behaviors, which are not mutually exclusive:  
1) Leakage of information or rumors. It might be that there was more leakage of 
information or rumors concerning the announcements of acquisitions of assets from 
distressed sellers than of acquisitions of assets from non-distressed sellers;  
2) Toehold positions on distressed sellers. According to Shleifer and Vishny’s (1986) 
model, the larger the toehold the greater is the likelihood of an offer. In the sample 
selection we require no toehold positions on the assets acquired, however, Zephyr database 
does not consider indirect ownership. As such, if an acquirer has a toehold position on the 
seller, Zephyr does not consider it to also have toehold positions on the seller’s assets. 
Therefore, it is possible that for distressed acquisitions, the acquirers had toehold positions 
on the sellers and because the sellers are in distress, it becomes more likely that they will 
have to sell assets to raise funds, and this likelihood starts to be incorporated by the market 
on the stock prices of acquirers with toehold positions; and finally,  
3) The seller’s financial condition. The pre-announcement stock run-up may be due 
to the fact that the seller is in distress. And as the likelihood of a distressed firm to sell 
assets increases, it is incorporated by other firms due to the possibility of acquiring assets at 
a better pricing. However, for this to be true other firms in the market would also have 
shown a stock run-up that would be erased after the deal announcement. 
 
                                                 
38 These results can be found on annex 4. 
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5.1.3. CARs by Deal Value (Un)Disclosed, Method of Payment, and Type of Asset 
Sold 
The results from the previous sub-section show that, on average, there are 
differences on how the market reacts to the announcement of a distressed and non-
distressed acquisition. We find that, on average, distressed yield higher returns than non-
distressed acquisitions, and the returns are statistically different for the event window [-
10;+1] for both models of expected returns. We also find that there is a statistically 
significant positive pre-announcement stock run-up for distressed while for non-distressed 
acquisitions it is positive but insignificant (the difference between medians is statistically 
significant at 5% level, for both models of expected returns). Given these differences, all 
the results provided in this sub-section are for the event window [-10;+1] and for the 
Market-Adjusted Model. 
We focus on the deal value (non-)disclosure, the method of payment, and the type of 
asset being sold by the selling firm (i.e. core and non-core assets) in order to assess the 
market reaction depending on whether it is a distressed or non-distressed acquisition39.   
 
5.1.3.1. Deal Value (Un)Disclosed 
Previous studies (e.g. Klein, 1986; Sicherman and Pettway, 1992; Martynova and 
Renneboog; 2011) have shown that disclosing and not disclosing the deal value at the 
announcement affects differently the returns independently of who is under study, the 
seller or the acquirer. As such, we study how the disclosure and non-disclosure of deal 
value affects the CARs and whether it is different when it is a distressed or a non-distressed 
acquisition. 
Consistent with previous work, the results (displayed on 6) show that for the full 
sample the returns are higher when the deal value is disclosed, although not statistically 
different from when undisclosed. For non-distressed acquisitions, as in Sicherman and 
Pettway (1992), the returns are significant (p-value<0.01) and statistically higher when the 
                                                 
39 Despite not reported, we also analysed the returns focusing on the industry relatedness of the acquisition. 
The returns for acquisitions of assets from related industries are not statistically different depending on 
whether it is a distressed or non-distressed acquisition. Also, according to Shleifer and Vishny’s (1992) model 
and to the findings of Pulvino (1998) and Ellul et al. (2011) the fire sale discount is higher when the acquirer 
of assets from a distressed seller is an industry outsider. Therefore, we also analysed the returns taking this 
into consideration. We initially defined as industry outsiders acquirers that did not share the 1-digit SIC code 
with the asset, and the returns between distressed and non-distressed acquisitions are not statistically 
different. We then used a broader definition of industry outsider, defining it as acquirers that did not share 
the same 2-digit SIC code, and the difference between the returns remained insignificant. 
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deal value is disclosed, when not disclosed the returns are insignificant. For distressed 
acquisitions, however, the returns are in both cases highly significant (p-value<0.01) and 
higher when the deal value is not disclosed, but not statistically different. 
 
Table 6. CARs by Deal Value (Un)Disclosed 
This table reports the cumulative abnormal returns for acquirers of assets by Deal Value 
Disclosed and Undisclosed at the announcement. Distressed represents acquisitions of assets from 
distressed sellers and Non-Distr. represents acquisitions of assets from non-distressed sellers. The 
last column reports the differences between Distressed and Non-Distressed samples. CARs were 
estimated through the Market-Adjusted Model for the event window [-10;+1]. For means we 
performed T-tests, for medians we performed Wilcoxon signed rank tests, and Wilcoxon rank-sum 
(Mann-Whitney) tests for the differences between medians. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
  All Distressed (1) Non-Distr. (2) Diff. (1-2) 
 
 
Deal Value Disclosed (3) Mean 2.07%    2.19%    2.00%    0.19 p.p. 
Med. 1.14%    0.96%    1.38%    -0.42 p.p. 
N 828 299 529  
 
Deal Value Undisclosed (4) Mean 0.95%  3.58%    -0.13% 3.71   p.p. 
Med. 0.79%   3.09%    0.31% 2.78   p.p. 
N 287 82 205  
 
Diff. D.V.Disc – D.V. Und. Mean 1.12 p.p. -1.39 p.p. 2.13   p.p.  
(3-4) 
Med. 0.35 p.p. -2.13 p.p. 1.07  p.p.  
 
According to Milgrom’s (1981) model, given incomplete information, not disclosing 
all information leads the uninformed to rationally expect this information to be 
unfavorable. Thus, not disclosing the amount paid for the assets would be interpreted by 
the market as the acquirer overpaying for the assets.  
Our results are consistent with not disclosing the deal value being interpreted as 
unfavorable information for the acquirer only when the seller is not in distress. When the 
seller is in distress, not disclosing the deal value is interpreted as favorable information for 
the acquirer. Indeed, while for non-distressed acquisitions when the deal value is not 
disclosed both mean and median CARs are insignificant (-0.13% and 0.31%, respectively), 
for distressed acquisitions they are both positive and significant at 1% level (3.58% and 
3.09%, respectively), the differences between means, and medians CARs for distressed and 
non-distressed acquisitions are significant at 1% level.  
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Given that in any deal there are two sides: the acquirer and the seller, the undisclosed 
information may be interpreted by the market as unfavorable to only one of the parties40. 
The market may interpret the lack of deal value disclosure when the seller is distressed as 
unfavorable for the selling firm, and consequently as favorable for the acquiring firm. 
Meaning that when the selling firm is in distress and the deal value is not disclosed the 
market may interpret the acquisition at a fire sale discount. 
The results suggest that the interpretation of fire sale discounts only happens when 
the deal value is not disclosed. When the deal value is disclosed, the returns for distressed 
and non-distressed acquisitions are both highly significant (p-value<0.01) but not 
statistically different from each other. For non-distressed the mean (median) CAR is 2.00% 
(1.38%) and for distressed acquisitions is 2.19% (0.96%).  
Therefore, the results suggest that fire sales exist because investors believe that they 
exist, by assessing only the deals that they do not know the deal value as acquisitions at fire 
sale discounts, given that, on average, investors do not assess acquisitions with disclosed 
deal value as more value creating when the seller is in distress. However, when they do not 
know the deal value they assume that acquiring divested assets from distressed sellers is 
made at favorable conditions (i.e. at fire sale discounts), and thus, interpret this type of 
acquisitions as more value creating. 
 
5.1.3.2. Method of Payment 
As mentioned in the literature review, previous studies have shown that the method 
of payment is one of the most important determinants of acquirer returns.  
Contrarily to what has been observed in acquisitions of public targets, in acquisitions 
of unlisted targets (stand-alone firms, subsidiaries only, and divested assets) it has been 
found that when the method of payment involves equity the returns are higher than those 
with all-cash (e.g. Chang 1998; Moeller et al., 2004; Slovin et al., 2005; Faccio et al., 2006). 
However, distressed sellers are more likely to sell assets for cash and the need for liquidity 
may make them accept higher price discounts (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Officer, 2007), 
                                                 
40 Sicherman and Pettway (1992) find that when the deal value is not disclosed the returns for non-
downgraded sellers are positive and significant (although smaller than when the deal value is disclosed), for 
the acquirers of those same assets the returns are insignificant. For the downgraded sub-samples, the returns 
are insignificant for both sellers and acquirers, possibly because in the downgraded sample are included sellers 
that are not in distress. 
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therefore, we analyse if the method of payment influences the returns depending on 
whether it is a distressed or a non-distressed acquisition.  
In our analysis we also include undisclosed methods of payment. However, given the 
results in the previous sub-section considering the deal value non-disclosure, we divide the 
undisclosed method of payment category into two distinct ones: undisclosed method of 
payment and undisclosed terms. The undisclosed method of payment represents deals in 
which only the method of payment was not disclosed, and undisclosed terms represents 
deals in which both method of payment and deal value were not disclosed. As such, the 
analysis is divided into four different categories of method of payment. 
Table 7 exhibits the CARs according to the method of payment. For the full sample, 
similarly to Martynova and Renneboog (2011), we find insignificant mean returns for 
acquisitions with undisclosed terms and as in their study it is this set of acquisitions that 
yields the lowest returns (0.76%). For the remaining methods of payments we find 
significant positive returns regardless the method of payment, which is consistent with 
Moeller et al. (2004) and Faccio et al. (2006) results for subsidiaries. 
 In line with Slovin et al. (2005), we find that acquisitions of divested assets with 
equity yield the highest returns, the mean CAR for acquisitions involving equity is 3.22%, 
in theirs is 9.77%. Considering all-cash acquisitions, the mean CAR for their sample is 
negative but insignificant (-0.30%), for ours is positive and highly significant (p-
value<0.01), 1.85%.  
The non-disclosure of method of payment only does not seem to influence as 
negatively the returns as when the deal value is not disclosed, since the mean CAR is 2.10% 
and highly significant (p-value<0.01). Given that acquisitions of divested assets are typically 
acquired with all-cash as method of payment41, the market may interpret this type of 
acquisitions as such. Indeed, not only the range of returns is quite similar, but also the great 
majority was in fact paid in all-cash 42. 
The results for non-distressed are in line with the full sample and consequently with 
previous work, however, the same is not observed for distressed acquisitions.  
 
 
 
                                                 
41 In Fuller et al. (2002) 75% of the subsidiary sample was acquired with all-cash, in Faccio et al. (2006) 87%, 
and in Officer (2007) 94%. Slovin et al. (2005) reports 70% for divested assets. 
42 Out of the 208 deals, we were able to find on firm’s SEC fillings 191 (91.8%), 186 (97.4%) were paid in all-
cash. 
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Table 7. CARs by Method of Payment 
This table reports the cumulative abnormal returns by method of payment: all-cash, equity, 
undisclosed method of payment (when only the method of payment was not disclosed), and 
undisclosed terms (when both the method of payment and the deal value were not disclosed). 
Distressed represents acquisitions of assets from distressed sellers and Non-Distr. represents 
acquisitions of assets from non-distressed sellers. The last column reports the differences between 
Distressed and Non-Distressed samples. Variables are defined on annex 3. CARs were estimated 
through the Market-Adjusted Model for the event window [-10;+1]. For means we performed T-
tests, for medians we performed Wilcoxon signed rank tests, and Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-
Whitney) tests for the differences between medians. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
  All Distressed (1) Non-Distr. (2) Diff. (1-2) 
 
All-Cash (3) Mean 1.85%    2.51%    1.43%    1.08 p.p. 
 
Med. 1.10%    1.40%    0.85%    0.55 p.p. 
 
N 549 210 339  
Equity (4) 
Mean 3.22%    0.30% 5.33%     5.63 p.p. 
 
Med. 1.03%   0.18% 2.08%   -2.26 p.p. 
 
N 104 39 65  
Undisclosed Method 
Mean 2.10%    2.77%    1.79%   0.98 p.p. 
 of Payment (5) 
Med. 1.31%    1.43%    1.26%    0.17 p.p. 
N 208 65 143  
Undisclosed Terms (6) 
Mean 0.76% 3.75%     0.31% 4.06   p.p. 
Med. 0.63%  3.25%    0.11% 3.14   p.p. 
N 254 67 187 
 
 
Diff. All-Cash - Und. Terms 
(3-6) 
Mean 1.09 p.p. -1.24 p.p. 1.74  p.p. 
 
Med. 0.47 p.p. -1.85 p.p. 0.96 p.p. 
 
 
Diff. Equity - Und. Terms 
(4-6) 
Mean 2.46 p.p. -4.05 p.p. 5.64   p.p. 
 
Med. 0.40 p.p.  3.43 p.p. 1.97  p.p. 
 
 
Diff. Und. M. P. - Und. Terms Mean 1.34 p.p. -0.98 p.p. 2.10  p.p. 
 
(5-6) 
Med. 0.47 p.p. -1.82 p.p. 1.37  p.p. 
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We find the highest returns in distressed acquisitions for deals with undisclosed 
terms, which are statistically different from non-distressed acquisitions (p-value<0.01)43; 
and the lowest returns for distressed acquisitions when the method of payment involves 
equity. For this last set of acquisitions, the returns are not only insignificantly different 
from zero44, but also the mean CAR is statistically different from non-distressed at 10% 
level. Considering all-cash and when the method of payment only is not disclosed, despite 
not statistically different, the mean CARs are around 1 p.p. higher for distressed 
acquisitions. 
The results suggest that the method of payment plays an important role on the 
market’s interpretation of fire sale discounts and are consistent with the argument that 
distressed sellers are more likely to sell assets for cash and the need for liquidity would 
make them accept higher price discounts (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Officer, 2007).  
In distressed acquisitions, when the method of payment is announced to be all-cash 
the mean CAR is 2.51% (p-value<0.01) and when not disclosed the mean CAR is also 
positive and highly significant (2.77%, p-value<0.01), possibly because the market assumes 
that the acquisition is going to be financed by all-cash. However, when the method of 
payment announced involves equity the mean CAR in distressed acquisitions is 
insignificant (-0.30%). Possibly, the market interprets the willingness of a distressed seller 
to accept equity as a signal that the firm is able to obtain a larger amount of funds by 
monetizing the stake received, despite the transaction costs, than if the method of payment 
was all-cash, and therefore a fire sale becomes less likely. Also, the positive signal conveyed 
by the acceptance of buyer’s equity by the seller argued by Slovin et al. (2005) may not happen 
in a distressed acquisition, because, due to its necessity for funds, the market may assume that a 
distressed seller will sell the stake received rather sooner than a non-distressed seller. And thus, 
it will not benefit from the future performance of the acquirer, which could explain the 
different reactions in distressed and non-distressed acquisitions when the method of payment 
involves equity. 
Overall, the results suggest that in distressed acquisitions more obscure deals (i.e. 
deals with undisclosed terms) lead to higher positive returns, the less is known about the 
distressed deal the better the reaction; and that the perception of fire sales is more likely 
when acquiring assets from distressed sellers as long the method of payment does not 
                                                 
43 This result is mainly driven by the deal value non-disclosure, despite not being the same sub-samples it is 
above 80% of the deals. 
44 The CARs remain insignificant if we exclude the methods of payment classified as “other”. 
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involve equity. As such, when the deal is announced the market reacts according to the 
method of payment. 
 
5.1.3.3. Type of Asset Sold 
As formerly mentioned, according to the literature there are different possible 
explanations for the motivation to sell assets other than to raise funds.  Fuller et al. (2002) 
suggest that the focusing hypothesis could imply that a firm may be willing to sell non-core 
assets at relatively lower prices than core assets. Also, Schlingemann et al. (2002) show that 
firms try to avoid asset sales in illiquid markets, which implies that if the firm is not in 
distress it may postpone the asset sale. They also show that firms are more likely to sell 
core assets when the market is relatively more liquid, meaning that the assets can be sold 
faster without a discount. Therefore, we analyse if the type of asset being sold influences 
the returns depending on whether it is a distressed or a non-distressed acquisition.  
Table 8 shows the results according to the type of asset being sold: core and non-
core. As in Fuller et al. (2002) for subsidiaries, the CARs for the full sample are not 
statistically different, but contrarily to their results we find a higher mean CAR for 
acquisitions of core assets: 2.35% for acquisitions of core and 1.37% for non-core assets 
(p-value<0.01, for both). 
Similarly to the full sample, for non-distressed the mean returns are higher for 
acquisitions of core assets than for non-core assets, but the differences between mean, and 
median CARs are significant at 5% level, which suggests that non-distressed firms are able 
to sell non-core assets at relatively higher prices than core assets. For distressed acquisitions 
and contrarily to non-distressed, we find higher CARs for acquisitions of sellers’ non-core 
assets, the median CARs are statistically different at 10% level, suggesting that distressed 
firms sell non-core assets at relatively lower prices than core assets. 
According to the liquidity hypothesis, firms try to avoid asset sales in illiquid markets, 
which implies that if the firm has financial flexibility (i.e. it is not in distress) it may 
postpone the asset sale. Therefore, when a non-distressed firm decides to sell non-core 
assets to focus on its core business (the focusing hypothesis) it may be able to postpone the 
sale until is able to find an acquirer willing to pay a high premium for them (the efficiency 
hypothesis). Due to this financial flexibility, a non-distressed firm may be able to sell non-
core assets at relatively higher prices than core assets, which could explain the significantly 
lower returns in non-distressed acquisitions of non-core assets. Distressed firms however, 
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may not have this financial flexibility to postpone the asset sale, also Schlingemann et al. 
(2002) find that firms are more likely to sell core assets when the market is relatively more 
liquid. Thus, to ease its financial situation a distressed firm may have to sell non-core assets 
at relatively lower prices than core assets, which could explain the significantly higher 
median returns in distressed acquisitions of seller’s non-core assets. 
 
Table 8. CARs by Type of Asset Sold 
This table reports the cumulative abnormal returns for acquirers by the type of asset being 
sold: Core and Non-Core. As Fuller et al. (2002), we define as core assets those that have the same 
3-digit SIC code as the seller’s, and as non-core otherwise. Distressed represents acquisitions of 
assets from distressed sellers and Non-Distr. represents acquisitions of assets from non-distressed 
sellers. The last column reports the differences between Distressed and Non-Distressed samples. 
CARs were estimated through the Market-Adjusted Model for the event window [-10;+1]. For 
means we performed T-tests, for medians we performed Wilcoxon signed rank tests, and Wilcoxon 
rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests for the differences between medians. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
  All Distressed (1) Non-Distr. (2) Diff. (1-2) 
Core Assets (3) Mean 2.35%    2.39%   2.33%    0.06 p.p. 
Med. 0.93%    0.85%  1.03%    -0.18 p.p. 
N 456 173 283  
Non-Core Assets (4) Mean 1.37%    2.57%    0.82%  1.75  p.p. 
Med. 1.14%    2.65%    0.38%  2.27   p.p. 
N 659 208 451  
Diff. Core A. - Non-Core A. Mean 0.98 p.p. -0.18 p.p. 1.51  p.p.  
(3-4) Med. -0.21 p.p.  1.80 p.p. 0.65  p.p.  
 
Our results suggest that the market reacts differently when the acquisition of non-
core assets is from a distressed or from a non-distressed seller45 and are consistent with the 
view that only distressed firms sell non-core assets at lower prices. Possibly, given that a 
distressed seller may not have the financial flexibility of a non-distressed seller to postpone 
the sale of its non-core assets, the market may interpret this type of acquisition as more 
likely to be done at fire sale discounts, and, as such, assesses them as more value creating. 
                                                 
45 For acquisitions of seller’s non-core assets the mean (median) CARs is statistically higher for distressed 
acquisitions at 5% (1%) level, for acquisitions of seller’s core assets the CARs are not statistically different 
from each other. However, in unreported results when we focus on deals with undisclosed deal value only, 
for both acquisitions of core and non-core assets the differences between CARs are statistically higher for 
distressed deals. 
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5.2. The effect of Distress – Multivariate Analysis 
In the previous section we analyse the returns using univariate comparisons, in this 
one we perform multivariate analysis of acquirer returns controlling for factors that have 
been shown by the literature to influence acquirer returns. 
The results from the univariate analysis suggest that the market reacts differently 
depending on whether it is a distressed or a non-distressed deal in acquisitions of seller’s 
non-core assets, and when the method of payment involves equity. As such, in our 
regression analysis we take into consideration these possible differences46.  
In sub-section 3.2.2., we introduced model (3.6), which we use as our base model for 
the regressions, although with some variations. In all regressions we control for the type of 
asset being sold, but in the second and third regressions of each panel we also include an 
interaction term to isolate the effect of the type of asset being sold (regressions 2, 4, 6, and 
7).  In Panel A we include all deals, in Panel B we account for the different reactions when 
the method of payment does and does not involve equity, as such we exclude deals with 
this method of payment. In Panel C, we once again include all deals, but differently from 
Panel A, we also include interaction terms to isolate the effect of the method of payment. 
 Table 9 (Panels A, B, and C) displays the regressions’ results. In Panel A, as expected 
the Distress coefficient is positive, however insignificant in both regressions, even after 
isolating the effect of acquiring distressed seller’s core assets through the interaction 
Distress*CoreAssets (regression 2). 
In Panel B, with the exclusion of deals in which the method of payment involves 
equity, the positive coefficient of Distress becomes significant in both regressions. In 
regression 3, Distress is significant at 5% level. In regression 4, due to the inclusion of the 
interaction Distress CoreAssets, the effect on CAR of acquiring distressed seller’s non-core 
assets is given by the variable Distress, its coefficient increases and becomes significant at 
1% level. For the interaction Distress*CoreAssets, we find a significant negative coefficient 
(p-value<0.05), which is higher than the coefficient of the variable Distress. For this panel 
of deals, given that the coefficient of Distress*CoreAssets overcomes the coefficient of 
Distress, the results suggest that acquirers experience higher returns only when acquiring 
distressed sellers’ non-core assets. 
                                                 
46 The results also suggest that deal value non-disclosure is assessed differently, we focus on this issue in the 
next sub-section.  
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Table 9. OLS Regression Analysis of CAR: The effect of Distress 
This table provides the OLS regressions of CAR. In all regressions the dependent variable is 
CAR for event window [-10;+1], estimated through the Market-Adjusted Model. In panel A and C 
all deals are included, and in Panel B deals with equity as method of payment are excluded. All 
variables are defined on annex 3. In all regressions we include dummy variables that control for 
assets acquired industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. For each variable, we list the coefficient 
and in parenthesis the heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. ***, **, and * stand for 
statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The statistically significant coefficients are 
denoted in bold. 
 Panel A (All)  Panel B (w/o Equity)  Panel C (All)  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
 
Distress 
 
0.006  
(0.007) 
 
0.015  
(0.009) 
 
 
        
(0.007) 
 
         
(0.009) 
 
 
       
(0.007) 
 
         
(0.009) 
 
 0.016  
 (0.011) 
Distress*Equity                
(0.032) 
         
(0.032) 
 
Distress*CoreAssets   0.020 
(0.014) 
           
(0.013) 
          
(0.013) 
 
Equity 0.000 
(0.016) 
 0.000 
(0.016) 
    0.025 
(0.020) 
0.005 
(0.023) 
 
CoreAssets 
 
0.007 
(0.007) 
       
(0.009) 
  0.001 
(0.007) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
 0.007 
(0.007) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
 
Equity*CoreAssets               
(0.031) 
 
Distress*NonEquity* 
NonCoreAssets 
 
                
(0.014) 
NonEquity         0.009 
(0.016) 
NonCoreAssets                 
(0.009) 
RelatedIndustry        
(0.007) 
 
0.011 
(0.007) 
        
(0.007) 
       
(0.007) 
        
(0.007) 
 
0.011 
(0.007) 
 
0.011 
(0.007) 
RelativeSize          
(0.006) 
         
(0.006) 
          
(0.005) 
         
(0.004) 
          
(0.006) 
         
(0.007) 
         
(0.006) 
Size           
(0.002) 
          
(0.002) 
           
(0.002) 
          
(0.002) 
           
(0.002) 
          
(0.002) 
          
(0.002) 
CrossBorder 0.012 
(0.009) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
 0.014 
(0.009) 
       
(0.009) 
 0.012 
(0.009) 
0.011 
(0.009) 
0.012 
(0.009) 
SmallSeller -0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
 -0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
 -0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
C&ISpread -0.008 
(0.022) 
-0.008 
(0.023) 
 -0.003 
(0.022) 
-0.002 
(0.022) 
 -0.008 
(0.023) 
-0.009 
(0.022) 
-0.006 
(0.023) 
Intercept 
  
-0.007 
(0.062) 
-0.009 
(0.063) 
 -0.030 
(0.063) 
-0.034 
(0.064) 
 -0.013 
(0.062) 
-0.014 
(0.063) 
-0.015 
(0.065) 
Adjusted R2 9.1% 9.2%  12.0% 12.3%  9.8% 10.5% 10.0% 
Industry and Year FF Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
F – Statistic 3.830
    3.786     4.557    4.562     4.008    4.051    4.057    
N 967 967  863 863  967 967 967 
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Considering Panel C, in regression 5 due to the interaction term Distress*Equity, the 
effect of acquiring assets from a distressed seller when the method of payment does not 
involve equity is represented by the variable Distress. Consistent with regression 3, the 
coefficient of Distress is positive and significant (p-value<0.06). In regard to 
Distress*Equity, we find a significant negative effect on CAR when the method of payment 
used in an acquisition of assets from a distressed seller involves equity (p-value<0.05), and 
its coefficient is higher than the coefficient of the variable Distress. This suggests lower 
returns in acquisitions from distressed sellers when equity is used as method of payment. 
In regression 6, we include several interaction terms in order to isolate the effects of 
the method of payment and the type of asset sold by the selling firm. Consistent with the 
previous regressions, for the interactions Distress*Equity and Distress*CoreAssets, we find 
negative coefficients, significant at 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Due to these 
interactions, acquisitions of distressed sellers’ non-core assets without equity are 
represented by the variable Distress. Consistent with regression 4, its coefficient is positive 
and significant at 1% level.  
Overall, for distressed acquisitions there is a statistically significant negative impact 
on CAR when the method of payment involves equity, and a statistically significant positive 
impact on CAR that is driven by acquisitions of non-core assets, given that we find a 
statistically significant negative effect for acquisitions of core assets. Thus, the results 
suggest that the higher returns in acquisitions of assets from distressed sellers are limited to 
acquisitions of seller’s non-core assets when the method of payment does not involve 
equity.  
We test and confirm these results in regression 7. For this regression we include the 
interaction term Distress*NonEquity*NonCoreAssets that captures the impact of 
acquiring distressed seller’s non-core assets without equity. As such, all other distressed 
acquisitions are represented by the variable Distressed. We find a negative and insignificant 
coefficient for the variable Distress, suggesting that the impact on CAR is not statistically 
different from non-distressed acquisitions. And for Distress*NonEquity*NonCoreAssets 
we find a positive coefficient, significant at 1% level. As such, the results suggest that, 
indeed, the higher returns in acquisitions of assets from distressed sellers are limited to 
those acquisitions that the market may interpret as more likely to be a fire sale, i.e. 
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acquisitions of seller’s non-core assets when the method of payment does not involve 
equity47. 
Regarding non-distressed acquisitions, the overall results suggest that the impacts on 
CAR of the method of payment and of the type of asset sold (i.e., core and non-core 
assets) are not statistically different from one another, except in acquisitions of core assets 
with equity. Given that, in regression 6, the interaction between Equity*CoreAssets has a 
positive and significant coefficient at 10% level, suggesting that when acquiring core assets 
from non-distressed sellers the returns are higher when the method of payment involves 
equity.  
Finally, in regard to the control variables, the evidence confirms the findings of 
Moeller et al. (2004) and suggests that larger acquirers experience lower returns, in all 
regressions the variable Size has a negative and statistically significant coefficient (p-
value<0.01). Also in line with previous work (e.g. Fuller et al., 2002; Slovin et al., 2005; 
Masulis and Nahata, 2011) we find that the relative deal size in acquisitions of unlisted 
targets has a positive and significant effect on CAR (p-value<0.01 in all regressions), 
suggesting that as the relative size of the deal increases so do the acquirers’ returns. We also 
find positive and significant coefficients for acquisitions in related industries in regressions 
1, 3, 4 and 5, and for cross-border acquisitions in regression 4 (p-value<0.10 for all 
coefficients). 
 
5.3. The effect of Deal Value Non-disclosure – Multivariate Analysis 
The results from the univariate analysis indicate that the deal value non-disclosure is 
assessed differently by the market depending on whether the acquisition of assets is from a 
distressed or a non-distressed seller. Specifically, we find that when the deal value is 
undisclosed the returns for acquisitions of assets from distressed sellers are positive and 
highly significant, whereas when from non-distressed sellers the returns are insignificantly 
negative, the difference between the mean (and median) CARs is significant (p-value<0.01, 
for both). 
The results for non-distressed acquisitions are then consistent with the results of 
Sicherman and Pettway (1992) and of Martynova and Renneboog (2011), however for 
                                                 
47 The positive impact it is not driven by the deals with undisclosed deal value. In unreported results, we also 
find a positive and significant coefficient limited to this type of acquisitions after excluding deals with 
undisclosed deal value, and even after additionally requiring a minimum relative deal size. 
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distressed acquisitions our results contradict their findings. Thus, we perform a multivariate 
analysis using model (5.1). 
                                                                   
                                                                    (5.1) 
                                                               
 
 
Except for the variable RelativeSize48, we use the same control variables as in the 
model (3.6), introduced in the sub-section 3.2.2.. As explanatory variables we include 
                      that is an indicator equal to one if the deal value was not 
disclosed at the announcement and zero otherwise, and                       
          which is an interaction term between the deal value undisclosed indicator and 
the Distress variable, which is equal to one if the acquisition is from a distressed seller. The 
interaction term captures the additional effect of the deal value non-disclosure when the 
acquisition is from a distressed seller. Therefore, the total impact for non-distressed 
acquisitions is given by the coefficient of DealValueUndisclosed, for distressed acquisitions 
the total impact is given by the sum of both coefficients. 
Given that previous studies have shown that the deal value non-disclosure affects 
negatively acquirer returns, for DealValueUndisclosed we expect a negative effect. For the 
interaction term if indeed the acquisition is seen positively for distressed acquisitions as the 
univariate analysis suggests, then there will be a positive effect.  
Table 10 shows the results for the regressions of the effect of deal value non-
disclosure on acquirer returns. There are three regressions, and in terms of setting, the 
main difference among them is the dependent variable. In regression 1 we use the CARs 
for event window [-10;+1], in regression 2 for [-1;+1], and in regression 3 for [-10;+10].  
The results of the univariate analysis are confirmed. We find evidence that the deal 
value non-disclosure has a statistically significant negative impact suggesting that not 
disclosing the deal value leads to lower returns, which is consistent with previous studies. 
In regression 1, the coefficient of DealValueUndisclosed is negative and significant at 1% 
level. The interaction DealValueUndisclosed*Distress is also significant (p-value<0.02), but 
with a positive coefficient. We interpret these results as evidence that indeed the market 
                                                 
48 We excluded the variable RelativeSize because its inclusion would lead 49% (140 out of 287) of the deals 
with undisclosed deal value to be dropped in this multivariate analysis. 
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assesses differently not disclosing the deal value depending on the seller’s financial 
condition.  
 
Table 10. OLS Regression Analysis of CAR: The effect of Deal Value Undisclosed  
This table provides OLS regressions of CAR. In regression (1) the dependent variable is 
CAR for event window [-10;+1], in (2) is for [-1;+1], and in (3) is for [-10;+10]. All dependent 
variables were estimated through the Market-Adjusted Model. All variables are defined on annex 3. 
In all regressions we include dummy variables that control for assets acquired industry fixed effects 
and year fixed effects. For each variable, we list the coefficient and in parenthesis the 
heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. ***, **, and * stand for statistical significance at 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively. The statistically significant coefficients are denoted in bold. 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 
DealValueUndisclosed 
 
          
(0.007) 
 
 
          
(0.005) 
 
 
         
(0.010) 
DealValueUndisclosed*Distress         
(0.014) 
         
(0.008) 
        
(0.020) 
Equity 0.006 
(0.016) 
 0.005 
(0.010) 
 -0.004 
(0.020) 
CoreAssets 0.008 
(0.007) 
         
(0.004) 
 0.0045 
(0.009) 
RelatedIndustry 0.007 
(0.006) 
 0.000 
(0.004) 
 0.000 
(0.009) 
Size           
(0.002) 
           
(0.002) 
           
(0.002) 
CrossBorder 0.002 
(0.008) 
 0.004 
(0.004) 
 0.017 
(0.012) 
SmallSeller -0.007 
(0.007) 
         
(0.005) 
 -0.009 
(0.009) 
C&ISpread -0.000 
(0.023) 
 0.026 
(0.019) 
 0.012 
(0.028) 
Intercept 
 
0.025 
(0.059) 
 0.015 
(0.039) 
 0.050 
(0.070) 
Adjusted R2 3.2%  4.9%  2.7% 
Industry and Year FF Yes  Yes  Yes 
F – Statistic 2.073
     2.675     1.915    
N 1106  1106  1106 
 
The lack of information about the deal value makes investors pessimist about the 
amount paid when the acquisition is from a non-distressed seller, whereas when the 
acquisition is from a distressed seller it makes them optimist. The deal value non-disclosure 
when the acquisition is from a distressed seller makes investors so optimist that the total 
effect is positive. 
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In regard to the results for regressions 2 and 3 that have as dependent variable the 
CARs for the event window [-1;+1] and for the event window [-10;+10], respectively. Our 
results provide evidence that the effect is not limited to the event window [-10;+1], in both 
regressions the coefficients of the explanatory variables maintain their signs and they 
continue to be statistically significant (although at different levels for regression 3). The 
total effect for acquisitions from distressed sellers remains positive. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this dissertation, we investigate if fire sales exist by studying the value creation 
from acquiring assets from distressed firms, and focusing on acquisitions of divested assets 
(assets, subsidiaries, divisions) involving US nonfinancial public firms between 1997 and 
2017.  
In line with previous studies (e.g. Rosenfeld, 1984; Sicherman and Pettway, 1992; 
Moeller et al., 2004), acquisitions of unlisted assets create value. Acquirers earn positive and 
significant average announcement period abnormal returns independently of the model or 
the event window considered, and regardless of the seller’s financial condition.  
In regard to the results that answer our research question: Do asset fire sales exist? 
We find that, on average, acquisitions of assets from distressed sellers create significantly 
more value, which suggests that fire sales of heterogeneous real assets exist. However, this 
result is driven by the deals in which the deal value was not disclosed at the announcement.  
When the deal value is disclosed the returns for acquisitions of assets from distressed and 
from non-distressed sellers are not statistically different from each other, which suggests 
the previous results (that suggest that fire sales exist) only occurred because investors 
believe fire sales exist, given that investors only assess the deals that they do not know the 
deal value as acquisitions at fire sale discounts. 
Our results suggest that the type of asset being acquired and the method of payment 
are important determinants on the market’s perception of fire sales. We find a statistically 
significant positive impact on acquirer returns when acquiring assets from distressed sellers 
but limited to those acquisitions that the market may interpret as more likely to be a fire 
sale, i.e., acquisitions of seller’s non-core assets when the method of payment does not 
involve equity.  
In fact, contrarily to previous work (e.g. Moeller et al., 2004; Slovin et al., 2005; Faccio 
et al., 2006) that finds higher and significant returns when acquiring unlisted targets (stand-
alone firms, subsidiaries only, and divested assets) with equity, we provide evidence that 
when the acquisition is from distressed sellers the returns are insignificant. Possibly, due to 
its necessity for funds, the market assumes that a distressed seller will sell the stake received 
rather sooner than a non-distressed seller, and thus it will not benefit from the future 
performance of the acquirer. Therefore, the positive signal conveyed by the acceptance of 
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buyer’s equity by the seller argued by Slovin et al. (2005) does not happen in a distressed 
acquisition. 
We also study the effect of deal value non-disclosure on CAR. The results are 
consistent with the market assessing differently the non-disclosure of deal value depending 
on the financial condition of the seller. In line with Sicherman and Pettway (1992) and 
Martynova and Renneboog (2011), we find a statistically significant negative impact on 
CAR when the deal value is not disclosed, but only for acquisitions of assets from non-
distressed sellers. When the assets are acquired from distressed sellers the deal value non-
disclosure has a positive and statistically significant impact on CAR. The results are 
consistent with our hypothesis that the lack of information about the deal value makes 
investors pessimist about the amount paid when the acquisition is from a non-distressed 
seller, whereas when the acquisition is from a distressed seller it makes them optimist. It 
makes investors so optimist that the total effect is positive. 
Overall, our results suggest that the market interprets as fire sales, acquisitions of 
assets from distressed sellers when the deal value is not disclosed, and also in acquisitions 
of seller’s non-core assets as long the method of payment does not involve equity.  
However, we did not study transaction prices thus the results may be indeed only a 
perception of fire sales and not the reality. As such, future research on transaction prices 
will help to clarify this issue. Until then, to answer the question if fire sales are indeed a 
reality or just a perception, we will follow a similar approach to Myers (1984) and quote 
Black (1976, p.8): “We don’t know”. But what we do know is that the perception of fire sales 
is a reality.   
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Annexes 
Annex 1. Main results on short-term of prior studies on Mergers and Acquisitions 
This table summarises the main results on the short-term and methodological aspects of recent studies on M&A. MAM = Market-Adjusted model; 
MM = Market Model; CAR= Cumulative Abnormal Return. 
Study 
Sample 
Period 
Sample 
Size 
Estimation 
Period (days) 
Event Window 
(days) 
Methodology 
Results49 (in %) 
Public Private Subsidiary 
 
Fuller et al. (2002) 
 
1990-2000 
 
3,135 
 
____ 
 
[-2;+2] 
 
MAM CAR 
 
-1.00 
(456) 
 
2.08 
(2.060) 
 
2.75 
(619) 
Moeller et al. (2004) 1980-2001 12,023 [-260;-6] [-1;+1] MM CAR -1.022 
(2,642) 
1.496 
(5,583) 
2.002 
(3,798) 
Faccio et al. (2006)50 1996-2001 4,429 ____ [-2;+2] MAM CAR -0.3851 
(735) 
1.51 
(1,956) 
1.44 
(1,738) 
Mantecon (2008) 1996-2003 135 [-250;-60] [-1; 0] MM CAR -1.83 
(84) 
4.11 
(51) 
____ 
Jaffe et al. (2015) 1981-2012 3,406 ____ [-1;+1] MAM CAR -1.46 
(2,571) 
____ 2.14 
(835) 
  
                                                 
49 In between brackets is the number of observations. 
50 Unlike the other studies, that are for the US, this one is for the Western Europe. 
51 Not statistically significant. 
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Annex 2. The impact of the bargaining condition: results from previous studies 
This table summarises the results of previous studies in regard of the impact of independent variables that represent the bargaining condition of the 
target and/or seller on the dependent variable. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return, [+] represents a positive impact and [–] a negative impact. 
Study Dependent variable Independent Variable Impact Significant? 
Sicherman and Pettway (1992) CAR Downgrade [+] No 
Faccio et al. (2006) CAR 
Unlisted stand-alone target [+] Yes 
Unlisted subsidiary target [+] Yes 
Masulis and Nahata (2011) 
Takeover Premium 
VC liquidity 
[–] Yes 
CAR [+] No 
Jindra and Moeller (2015) 
Takeover premium 
Target Financial independence 
[+] Yes 
CAR [–] Yes 
Greene (2017) 
Acquisition multiple 
DeregulatedState*After 
[+] Yes 
CAR [–] Yes 
Acquisition multiple 
DeregulatedState 
[–] Yes 
CAR [+] Yes 
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Annex 3. Variables Definition 
 
Variable 
 
Description 
 
Acquirer Size 
 
Market value of equity one month before the deal announcement date. Source: 
DataStream 
 
All-Cash 
 
Any combination of cash, debt, or liabilities. Source: Zephyr 
 
C&I Spread 
 
The spread between the average rate charged for commercial and industrial loans 
and the fed funds rate in the previous quarter to the announcement date reported in 
the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending. Source: Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System website 
 
Core Assets 
 
Zero-one dummy variable equal to one, if the assets acquired share the same 3-digit 
SIC code with the seller. Source: Zephyr 
 
Cross Border 
 
Zero-one dummy variable equal to one if the assets acquired do not have as country 
code the US, zero otherwise. Source: Zephyr 
 
Deal Value 
 
The deal value reported on Zephyr. When not available, the amount paid reported 
on firm’s SEC filings. Sources: Zephyr, SEC’s EDGAR 
 
Deal Value 
Undisclosed 
 
Zero-one dummy variable equal to one when the deal value is not available on 
Zephyr. Source: Zephyr 
 
Distress 
 
Zero-one dummy variable, one represents an acquisition of assets from a distressed 
seller, zero otherwise. Firms in distress are defined as those with negative earnings 
on the previous fiscal year to the sale announcement. Source: DataStream 
 
Equity 
 
Zero-one dummy variable equal to one if the method of payment involves any 
form of equity. Source: Zephyr 
 
Leverage 
 
Ratio between the book values of total debt and total assets on the fiscal year 
before the deal announcement. Source: DataStream 
 
Non Core 
Assets 
 
Zero-one dummy variable, equal to one if the assets acquired do not share the same 
3-digit SIC code with the seller. Source: Zephyr 
 
Non Equity 
 
Zero-one dummy variable equal to one if the method of payment does not involve 
any form of equity. Source: Zephyr 
 
Related 
Industry 
 
Zero-one dummy variable, equal to one if the acquirer shares the same 3-digit SIC 
code with the asset acquired, zero otherwise. Source: Zephyr 
 (Continues on the next page) 
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Variable Description 
 
Relative Size 
 
The ratio between deal value and acquirer’s size. If the deal value is undisclosed, we 
assume the market is able to infer the relative size of the acquisition, and use the 
actual amount paid to compute the ratio. Sources: Zephyr, SEC’s EDGAR 
 
 
Seller Size 
 
Market value of equity one month before the deal announcement date. Source: 
DataStream 
 
Size 
 
Logarithm of acquirer’s size. 
 
Small Seller 
 
Zero-one dummy variable, equal to one if the seller size is equal or less than the 
median seller size of the full sample, zero otherwise. 
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Annex 4 . CARs for Event Window  -   -   
This table shows the results from the event study methodology applied to the Distressed and 
Non-Distressed samples for event window [-10;-2]. Distressed represents acquisitions of assets 
from distressed sellers and Non-Distressed represents acquisitions of assets from non-distressed 
sellers. The last column reports the differences between Distressed and Non-Distressed samples. 
CARs were estimated through the Market-Adjusted Model. For means we performed T-tests, for 
medians we performed Wilcoxon signed rank tests, and Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) tests 
for the differences between medians.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10%, respectively. 
 Distressed  Non-Distressed  Difference 
Panel A: CARs for Cumulative Returns 
Mean 0.76%
   0.26%  0.50 p.p. 
Median 0.55%
    0.34%  0.20 p.p. 
Panel B: CARs for Market-Adjusted Model 
Mean 0.78%
   0.15%  0.62 p.p. 
Median 0.76%
    0.17%  0.59 p.p. 
Panel C: CARs for Market Model 
Mean 0.75%
   0.12%  0.63 p.p. 
Median 0.64%
    0.06%  0.58 p.p. 
N 381 
 734   
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